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THE LOCATION OF HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS*
KEVIN BENNARDO** & MARK GLOVER***
North Carolina should abolish its location requirement for making a
holographic will. Under the North Carolina holographic wills
statute, a handwritten document must be found in an approved
location after its author’s death in order to be regarded as a
holographic will. No other state has mandated a location
requirement for holographic wills since 1941.
The location requirement furthers neither of the core functions of
will execution formalities: it makes probate courts’ decisions less
efficient but no more accurate. And, because holographic wills in
North Carolina are not technically executed until they are found
postmortem, confounding doctrinal issues arise when testators
attempt to revoke them before death. The location requirement of the
holographic wills statute imposes costs without countervailing
benefits.
Thus, the North Carolina General Assembly should abolish the
location requirement from the holographic wills statute. In its place,
the location in which a decedent stores a purported holographic will
should be relegated to simply one contributing factor in assessing
testamentary intent. Such a revision would reflect sound policy and
bring North Carolina into accord with the rest of the country when it
comes to the making of holographic wills.
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INTRODUCTION
Edward Kidder Graham, the eleventh president of the University of
North Carolina,1 died in the influenza pandemic of 1918. 2 The disposition
of Graham’s estate was reportedly governed by a handwritten note that he
prepared in a hotel lobby while he waited to attend the last meeting of the
university trustees prior to his death. 3 Although wills typically are formal
documents that are executed in the presence of witnesses, 4 a majority of
states authorize informal wills, known as holographic wills, which must be
handwritten and signed by the testator but need not be witnessed. 5
Therefore, in most states, Graham’s handwritten will would have been
legally effective simply by his act of signing it.
North Carolina is not like most states, however; at least not with
respect to the validity of holographic wills. While all states that authorize
1. See About the Office, UNC OFF. CHANCELLOR, https://chancellor.unc.edu/theoffice/#chapter-5 [https://perma.cc/TZ7J-EMXB] (last updated 2019).
2. HOWARD E. COVINGTON JR., FIRE AND S TONE: T HE MAKING OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH C AROLINA UNDER PRESIDENTS EDWARD K IDDER GRAHAM AND HARRY WOODBURN
CHASE 174–76 (2018).
3. See Patrick Henry Winston, Note, Holographic Wills in North Carolina, 2 N.C. L. REV.
106, 106 n.2 (1924).
4. See David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 1134 (2015)
[hereinafter Horton, Wills Law] (reporting that only 32 of 332 wills in an empirical study of
probate records from Alameda County, California were holographic); see also Stephen Clowney,
In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 42 (2008) (reporting that only 145 of approximately 10,000 estates in
an empirical study of probate records from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania included holographic
wills).
5. See ROBERT H. S ITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 198–99
(10th ed. 2017).
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holographic wills require the testator’s handwriting and signature, North
Carolina is unique in that a holographic will’s validity also depends upon
the place in which the will is discovered upon the testator’s death.6 This
location requirement renders a holographic will invalid unless it is
discovered among the testator’s valuable papers, at some secure location
like a safe-deposit box, or in the possession of someone whom the testator
charged with its safekeeping.7 As such, if Graham’s estate truly was
distributed according to the terms of a note that he wrote during a brief
moment of spare time, then he must have deposited his informal
testamentary document in a location that satisfied his home state’s unique
holographic will statute.
Given that North Carolina stands alone in requiring that valid
holographic wills be stored in particular locations, the question becomes
whether this idiosyncratic requirement is justified by sound policy
considerations. If so, then, unless there is something truly peculiar about
North Carolinians, it would seem that the other states that recognize
holographic wills should implement similar location requirements. If not,
then the North Carolina General Assembly should abolish the location
requirement and bring its holographic will statute in line with the majority
approach. To address this question, this Article explores the doctrinal
development of North Carolina’s approach to holographic wills, analyzes
the policy foundations of the location requirement, and ultimately
concludes that North Carolina should abandon its requirement that
holographic wills be stored in prescribed locations.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I chronicles the historical
evolution of North Carolina’s holographic wills statute and explains the
doctrinal particularities of the location requirement. Parts II and III explore
the policy implications of the location requirement in the context of both
creating holographic wills and revoking them. Finally, Part IV proposes
that, rather than being a mandatory requirement for the effectiveness of
holographic wills, a document’s location should be treated as a relevant,
but not necessary, consideration when courts evaluate the validity of
holographic wills.
I. HOLOGRAPHS AND THE LOCATION REQUIREMENT
All states allow testators to distribute property upon death through
formal attested wills. 8 Although the specifics vary from state to state, a

6. See infra Section I.B.
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a) (2017).
8. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 142–43 (describing the various sources of
will execution statutes amongst the states).
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formal attested will must comply with three primary formalities: (1) it must
be in writing, (2) it must be signed by the testator, and (3) it must be
attested by two witnesses. 9 In addition to the formal attested will, a slim
majority of states also authorize a testator to execute an informal
holographic will. 10 Like an attested will, a holographic will must be signed
and written.11 However, the requirements for executing a holographic will
differ from the requirements for executing a formal attested will in two key
respects. First, a holographic will need not be witnessed. 12 Second, while
both an attested will and a holographic will must be written, the testator
must write a holographic will by hand. 13 If the testator signs a holographic
will, it is valid despite the fact that witnesses were not involved in the will
execution ceremony.
The general rationale for authorizing informal holographic wills is to
make the process of creating a will easier. The execution of a formal
attested will can be costly, as it typically involves consultation with an
estate-planning attorney. 14 By contrast, holographic wills are designed to
simplify the process of creating a will, so that a testator can execute a will
without legal assistance. 15 Professor Adam Hirsch nicely summarizes this
rationale when he explains:
Holographic wills . . . ensur[e] that a person’s modest financial
means do not abridge her legal means of carrying out her estate plan.
By providing citizens a simple and straightforward vehicle for estate
planning without the assistance of professional counsel, holographic

9. See id.
10. See id. at 198–99 (identifying twenty-seven states that authorize holographic wills).
11. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2
(AM. LAW INST. 1999).
12. See id. § 3.2 cmt. a.
13. There is variation amongst the states that authorize holographic wills regarding the
extent to which a holographic will must be handwritten. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note
5, at 208–10.
14. See Daphna Hacker, Soulless Wills, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 957, 979–80 (2010)
(“[L]awyers dominate the will-production market, and most testators turn to them for advice in
drafting their wills . . . .”); see also Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative
Intent, 65 UCLA L. REV. 324, 363 (2018) (“[T]he valid execution and drafting of a will may have
more to do with having a legal education or the economic resources to hire a quality attorney than
any action or characteristic intrinsic to the person receiving the reward of having her donative
intent respected.”).
15. See Alexander v. Johnston, 171 N.C. 468, 469, 88 S.E. 785, 786 (1916) (“The purpose of
the statute is to enable persons who cannot procure the assistance of others in the preparation of a
will . . . to execute a valid will by a paper in their own handwriting, and without the formal
attestation of witnesses . . . .”); Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of
Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 160 (1988) (“Legislatures authorize
holographic wills as a means of convenience to testators, enabling those who are either unable or
unwilling to obtain legal assistance to make a valid will in their own handwriting.”).
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wills make dying testate far easier and hence promote the principle
of “equal estate planning under law” . . . .16
By authorizing testators to distribute property through holographic wills, 17
North Carolina is in the majority of states that recognize streamlining the
will execution process as a worthy policy.
Among this majority, however, North Carolina is unique. North
Carolina courts do not simply evaluate the validity of holographic wills
based upon the familiar requirements that the document be handwritten and
signed by the testator. Rather, North Carolina is the sole domestic
jurisdiction to require that the document be kept in specified locations in
order for it to qualify as a holographic will.18 Specifically, the North
Carolina will execution statute requires that a valid holographic will be
[f]ound after the testator’s death among the testator’s valuable papers
or effects, or in a safe-deposit box or other safe place where it was
deposited by the testator or under the testator’s authority, or in the
possession or custody of some person with whom, or some firm or
corporation with which, it was deposited by the testator or under the
testator’s authority for safekeeping. 19
In simplified terms, the location requirement is best understood as
identifying three primary locations that suffice to validate a will: (1) among
the testator’s valuable papers or effects, (2) in a safe-deposit box or other
safe place, or (3) in the possession of a third party with whom the
instrument was deposited for safekeeping. 20

16. Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO S T. L.J. 1057, 1074–75 (1996)
[hereinafter Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency].
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a) (2017).
18. Tennessee previously had a similar location requirement, but it was removed from the
holographic will statute in 1941. See In re Will of Gilkey, 256 N.C. 415, 420, 124 S.E.2d 155,
158 (1962); see also Winston, supra note 3, at 107 (noting that North Carolina and Tennessee
were the only two states with a location requirement).
19. § 31-3.4(a). One witness must testify regarding the location of the will. Id. § 28A-2A9(2).
20. Some North Carolina courts have listed five permissible locations by separating
“valuable papers” from “valuable effects” and “safe-deposit box” from “other safe place.” See,
e.g., In re Will of Church, 121 N.C. App. 506, 508–09, 466 S.E.2d 297, 298 (1996). This is
undeniably true—the options are disjunctive and any one is sufficient. See In re Will of Allen,
148 N.C. App. 526, 533, 559 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2002) (“[T]he statute should be read in the
disjunctive, and, thus, that a will is valid if found either in a safe deposit box, or among testator’s
valuable papers or among testator’s valuable effects, or in a safe place.”(citing In re Will of
Church, 121 N.C. App. at 509; 466 S.E.2d at 298)) . For ease of discussion, this Article will lump
them together into three categories.
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Legislative History

When the North Carolina General Assembly first enacted a will
execution statute in April 1784, all wills conveying an interest in land
required two witnesses. 21 However, when the legislature reconvened four
months later in October, the statute was amended to include a provision
authorizing holographic wills. 22 Although the language of the original
statute that authorized holographic wills differs from the current statutory
language, it nonetheless included a location requirement. In particular, the
original statute required valid holographic wills either to be “found
amongst the valuable papers or effects of any deceased person” or to “have
been lodged in the hands of any person for safe keeping.” 23
The holographic wills statute of 1784 remained unchanged for seventy
years until the General Assembly authorized the consolidation and
arrangement of the state’s general statues into the North Carolina Revised
Code of 1854.24 The only change to the location requirement was the
substitution of the word “or” in the phrase “among the valuable papers or
effects” for the word “and.”25 Despite this change in the wording of the
statute to “‘among the valuable papers and effects’ of the deceased
person,” the Supreme Court of North Carolina attributed no substantive
change to the substituted language. 26
After this minor antebellum alteration, the statute stood untouched for
nearly a century. Then, in 1953, the General Assembly enacted the current
holographic wills statute which maintains a location requirement but with
an expanded menu of authorized locations. 27 In particular, the revised
21. Act of Apr. 19, 1784, ch. 22, § 11, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 351, 354. Prior to 1841, wills
conveying interests in personal property did not have to comply with the same formalities as were
required for wills that conveyed interests in real property. Act of Jan. 12, 1841, ch. 62, 1840–
1841 N.C. Sess. Laws 103.
22. Act of Oct. 22, 1784, ch. 10, § 5, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 378, 378–79; see also In re Will
of Gilkey, 256 N.C. 415, 417–18, 124 S.E.2d 155, 156 (1962) (chronicling the early history of
North Carolina’s will execution statute).
23. Act of Oct. 22, 1784, § 5, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws at 378–79.
24. N.C. REV. CODE ch. 119 § 1 (1854).
25. Id.
26. See In re Jenkins’ Will, 157 N.C. 429, 434, 72 S.E. 1072, 1073–74 (1911) (emphasis
added) (quoting N.C. REV. CODE. ch. 119 § 1 (1854)) (“We do not think the substitution of the
copulative for the disjunctive conjunction was intended to make any substantial change in the
law, and the word ‘and’ should be construed as ‘or.’”); Winstead v. Bowman, 68 N.C. 170, 173
(1873) (“We do not think that this substitution was intended to make any change in the meaning
of the Act.”); Hughes v. Smith, 64 N.C. 493, 495 (1870) (“The change of the conjunction ‘or,’ in
the Revised Statutes, to the conjunction ‘and,’ in the Revised Code, does not affect the
construction of the statute. If the word ‘and’ is taken in its strict conjunctive sense, the statute
would be virtually repealed, or its benefits greatly diminished . . . .”).
27. Act of Jan. 7, 1953, ch. 1098, sec. 2, § 31-3, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1024, 1024 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (2017)).
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statute added “a safe deposit box or other safe place” to the list of
acceptable locations, and it also specified that in addition to lodging a
holographic will with another person for safekeeping, the testator could
deposit her will with a “firm or corporation” for the same purpose. 28 In
addition to these larger changes, the 1953 statute reverted the phrase,
“among the valuable papers and effects,” back to “among [the] valuable
papers or effects.”29 The most recent amendment to the location
requirement took place in 2011, when the General Assembly revised the
state’s statutes for gender neutrality. 30
B.

Doctrinal Development

Although the literal language of the statute focuses on where the
instrument was “found” after the testator’s death, 31 courts have not
interpreted this requirement literally. In this context, the word “found” is
not synonymous with “discovered” or “found for the first time.” 32 For
example, the fact that a relative knows where the instrument is kept before
the testator’s death does not defeat the requirement that the document be
“found” after the testator’s death. 33 Rather, the requirement generally refers
to where the instrument is located at the time of the testator’s death. 34
Courts have adopted a more flexible interpretation in cases in which
the instrument was moved prior to the testator’s death without the testator’s
knowledge. In such cases, courts analyze where the testator kept the
instrument before it was moved rather than where it was literally located at
the time of death. 35 Likewise, if the instrument is unknowingly moved after
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphases added).
30. See Act of June 27, 2011, ch. 31, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1346, 1433.
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3) (2017).
32. See In re Will of Wilson, 258 N.C. 310, 312–13, 128 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1962).
33. Id. (rejecting the argument that testator’s brother could not have “found” the will after
her death because he had known for years that she kept it in her desk).
34. North Carolina courts appear to make an exception for holographic wills that are
destroyed contemporaneously (or nearly so) with the death of the testator. See Hewitt v. Murray,
218 N.C. 569, 570–72, 11 S.E.2d 867, 867–68 (1940). Although such a document may never be
“found” after the testator’s death, it may nonetheless be probated as a lost will as long as
sufficient evidence exists regarding where the document was stored at the time of its destruction.
See id. While this situation surely occurs infrequently, one such scenario is when a holographic
will is destroyed in the same house fire in which the decedent perished. As long as the
propounder of the will is able to demonstrate that the document was stored in one of the approved
locations, it appears that North Carolina courts would be amenable to probating a destroyed
holographic will that was never “found.” See id.
35. See In re Will of Gilkey, 256 N.C. 415, 420, 124 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1962) (“If the
document had been placed among the author’s valuable papers without her knowledge and
consent, it would of course have no validity as a will even though found among the papers after
the author’s death.”). Construing a similar statute, a Tennessee court clearly stated that relocation
of the instrument without the testator’s consent is irrelevant:
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the testator’s death but before it is found, courts analyze where it was kept
at the time of death rather than where it was literally discovered. 36
As a general matter, however, courts do not require affirmative proof
that a testator placed a holographic will in the location it is found after the
testator’s death. 37 Instead, courts presume that either the testator placed it
there or it was placed there at the testator’s direction. 38 Importantly,
however, it is not sufficient for the testator to have kept the holograph in an
approved location at just any point before her death—the critical inquiry is
where the instrument was kept at the time of death. 39 Thus, for example,
testimony regarding where the document was kept eight months before the
author’s death is inadequate to show that the document meets the
requirements of a holographic will. 40 After all, under the statute an
instrument does not even become a holographic will until the testator dies. 41
1. Among the Testator’s Valuable Papers or Effects
Although “among the testator’s valuable papers” and “among the
testator’s valuable effects” may technically be separate locations, 42 North
Carolina courts generally analyze whether the instrument was found among
the testator’s valuables without regard to whether the objects are papers,

The fact that the nurse moved the pocketbook [containing the holographic will] after [the
testator] was no longer able to watch over her affairs, a few hours before her death, and
put it in the trunk in the next room, without her knowledge or consent, cannot alter the
situation and require the beneficiaries under the will to show that the trunk was where
[the testator] kept her valuable papers.
Pulley v. Cartwright, 137 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).
36. See In re Westfeldt’s Will, 188 N.C. 702, 707–09, 125 S.E. 531, 533–34 (1924) (finding
that the decedent’s desk was the relevant location to analyze when a maid emptied the contents of
the desk into a trunk after the decedent’s death and the holographic will was later found in the
trunk); In re Sheppard’s Will, 128 N.C. 54, 55–57, 38 S.E. 27, 28 (1901) (finding that a
holographic will written in a book with other important memoranda and located under the
testator’s body at the time of his death was valid despite the fact that the book later fell behind a
bureau).
37. See In re Jenkins’ Will, 157 N.C. 429, 436, 72 S.E. 1072, 1074 (1911) (“If the paper is
so found, it will be presumed that the deposit of it in the place was made by [the testator], or with
[the testator’s] assent, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary or of suspicious
circumstances, no proof of the fact is required.”).
38. Id.
39. See Adams v. Clark, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 56, 57–58 (1860).
40. Id. at 58.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3) (2017) (stating that a document is not a holographic will
until it is “[f]ound after the testator’s death” in one of the approved locations); see also infra Part
III.
42. See In re Will of Church, 121 N.C. App. 506, 509, 466 S.E.2d 297, 298 (1996)
(enumerating “among the testator’s valuable papers” separately from “among the testator’s
valuable effects”).
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effects, or a mix of both.43 Here, the two main definitional tasks are
determining what qualifies as “valuable” and what qualifies as “among.”
The former is read quite broadly; the latter is less clear, but more recent
cases have adopted a fairly liberal approach. 44
Value is evaluated subjectively by assessing what was regarded to be
valuable by the decedent. 45 Valuable papers or effects have been described
as those that are regarded by the testator as worthy of preservation or that
“are kept and considered worthy of being taken care of by the particular
person, having regard to his condition, business, and habits of
preserv[ation].”46 Thus, while substantial pecuniary value certainly suffices,
a small pecuniary value is not disqualifying. Sentimental value to the
decedent is sufficient to qualify an item as a valuable paper or effect. 47
Moreover, the items need not be the decedent’s only valuable papers or
effects or even the decedent’s most valuable papers or effects. 48 When a
decedent keeps valuable items in multiple locations (as many individuals
do), keeping the holographic will among any of the decedent’s valuable
papers or effects satisfies the requirement. 49
For example, in Stephens v. McPherson,50 the testator kept her
holographic will in a jewelry box in a spare bedroom. 51 The jewelry box
also contained photographs of the testator’s nieces and nephews, gas bill
43. See, e.g., In re Westfeldt’s Will, 188 N.C. 703, 708–09, 125 S.E. 531, 534 (1924)
(upholding jury’s finding that holographic will was among the decedent’s “valuable papers and
effects in her desk” where the desk contained both papers and the decedent’s “precious
treasures”).
44. See infra notes 45–68 and accompanying text.
45. In re Will of Allen, 148 N.C. App. 526, 533, 559 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2002).
46. In re Will of Wilson, 258 N.C. 310, 313, 128 S.E.2d 601, 603–04 (1962).
47. In re Westfeldt’s Will, 188 N.C. at 708, 125 S.E. at 534 (“Papers that have a sentimental
and personal value are sometimes more precious and valuable to men and women than stocks and
bonds. Sometimes these letters and mementoes of the past are most tenderly kept, frequently in
trunks, according to the particular person’s condition, business, and habits of preserving
papers.”).
48. In re Jenkins’ Will, 157 N.C. 429, 437, 72 S.E. 1072, 1075 (1911). But see Lenoir Rhyne
Coll. v. Thorne, 13 N.C. App. 27, 33–34, 185 S.E.2d 303, 307–08 (1971) (approving a settlement
agreement because the outcome of whether holographic codicil was “among valuable papers” was
uncertain when the codicil was found on the testator’s sofa among unopened mail and the testator
kept other important papers, including an attested will, in a bank lockbox).
49. See Winstead v. Bowman, 68 N.C. 170, 174 (1873) (“We think that it is not only
possible for a man to have more than one place for keeping his valuable papers and effects, but
that men of any considerable estate, or engaged in any considerable business, do in general have
two such places or more.”). But see Brogan v. Barnard, 90 S.W. 858, 858–60 (Tenn. 1905)
(finding that a purported holograph was not among the decedent’s valuable papers when the
decedent was a country postmaster and the document was found at the decedent’s store in a box
among stamps and stationary belonging to the post office, but all of the decedent’s personal
valuables were kept in his residence).
50. 88 N.C. App. 251, 362 S.E.2d 826 (1987).
51. Id. at 253, 362 S.E.2d at 828.
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receipts, and costume jewelry. 52 The testator’s important documents were
found in a chest of drawers in the same room, in a drawer in the testator’s
bedroom, and in a hall closet. 53 Even though the other items in the jewelry
box had little pecuniary value and the testator had at least three other places
in her house that she kept valuable papers, the court found that the
holographic will was kept among the testator’s valuable papers and
effects.54 Even though the costume jewelry had little monetary value, the
court found that it was “obviously of value to” the testator because she
wore it regularly and the photographs “may have been of significant
sentimental value.”55 The court emphasized that value is measured by what
is “regarded by a decedent as worthy of preservation.”56
On occasion, the controversy involves whether the holographic
document was “among” other items of value. In these cases, the focal point
of the analysis is not whether the other items are “valuable,” but whether
the holograph was sufficiently proximate to valuable items. After all, it is
not the location itself, but rather the holograph’s proximity to the testator’s
other valuables, that is key. 57 Placing a holographic will in an open bowl on
a kitchen counter suffices as long as other items of value to the testator are
also in the bowl.58
When dealing with compartments, a holograph is “among” the other
items in the same compartment. However, a holograph in one compartment
of a multi-compartment vessel may not be “among” items in another
compartment. For example, in the antebellum case of Little v. Lockman,59
the court found that a holograph in one bureau drawer was not “among” the
valuable papers in another drawer of the same bureau.60 However, several
factors led the Little court to take such a restrictive view of the word
“among.” One drawer of the bureau contained valuable papers, such as
“deeds, notes, and other papers, relating to important transactions . . . tied
up in bundles and labeled.” 61 The other drawer contained “[p]apers of no
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 255–56, 326 S.E.2d at 829–30.
55. Id. at 256, 326 S.E.2d at 830.
56. Id. at 256, 326 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting In re Westfeldt’s Will, 188 N.C. 703, 709, 125
S.E. 531, 534 (1924)).
57. In re Will of Groce, 196 N.C. 373, 376, 145 S.E. 689, 690 (1928) (“There is no
requirement as to the place where the paper writing, and the valuable papers and effects, shall be
found.”).
58. In re Will of Allen, 148 N.C. App. 526, 534, 559 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2002) (mentioning
the testator’s “apparent style of life” in finding that holographic will in bowl along with
insurance, financial, and medical documents was considered among other valuable papers).
59. 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 494 (1857).
60. Id. at 497–98.
61. Id. at 497.
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appreciable value lying loose and scattered over the bottom of [the]
drawer,” including “several imperfect instruments of a testamentary
character.”62 The court regarded the character of the two drawers as entirely
different—one was clearly for preserving documents and one appeared to
be the decedent’s junk drawer.63 Moreover, because the purported
holograph was found among numerous other draft wills, the court found
that it was likely that the decedent also considered the purported holograph
to be a draft rather than a perfected will. 64
The “narrow rule” of Little has since been criticized for not affording
an appropriately liberal construction of the location requirement of the
statute.65 In one such later case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found
that a holographic will was “among” valuable papers and effects where the
testator carried all of his valuables on his person and died with his
holographic will in an envelope in his coat pocket.66 In determining the
testamentary nature of the instrument, the court made no distinction
between the fact that the will was kept in the testator’s coat pocket and his
other valuables were kept in the pockets of his overalls.67 While the
contents of one bureau drawer were not “among” the contents of another
drawer in Little, a more liberal construction found that the contents of a
testator’s coat pockets were “among” the contents of his overalls pockets. 68
2. In a Safe-Deposit Box or Other Safe Place
The case law is not well developed regarding what constitutes “a safedeposit box or other safe place.” 69 Presumably, holographs that are stored
in actual safes or in bank safe-deposit boxes are rarely challenged on the
basis of where they were stored. Moreover, other valuable papers or effects
would often also be present in a safe or safe-deposit box, and therefore the
62. Id.
63. See id. at 498 (stating that the decedent “almost certainly” would have put the instrument
in the tidy drawer “if he had intended it to operate as a will disposing of his whole estate”).
64. Id.
65. In re Will of Groce, 196 N.C. 373, 376, 145 S.E. 689, 690 (1928).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 375, 145 S.E. at 690 (“There was also found in the pockets of his coat and of his
overalls money in the sum of $1,499.92; also two pencils, a pocket knife, specks, some receipts,
etc. The money was found in the pockets of his overalls; it was mostly in bills, although there
were three gold pieces, of the value of $40.”).
68. Id. at 376–77, 145 S.E. at 690–91. Little and In re Will of Groce may be reconciled,
however, because the purported holograph in Little was found in what appeared to be a junk
drawer. Little, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) at 495. In In re Will of Groce, the decedent did not appear to
have a junk pocket and a tidy pocket. The character of the In re Will of Groce decedent’s pockets
were comparable; thus, no negative inference was drawn from the decedent keeping his
holograph in a separate pocket from his money. If all of the drawers in the Little decedent’s
bureau had been comparably tidy, the outcome may well have been different.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3) (2017).
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statutory requirement would also be satisfied independently through that
avenue.70
One case, In re Will of Church,71 sheds light on what constitutes an
“other safe place” under the statute. After the In re Will of Church
decedent’s death, her family and friends found a pocketbook hanging on a
hook on the inside of the decedent’s bedroom closet door. 72 In the
pocketbook, there was an envelope clearly marked as the decedent’s will.
Inside the envelope was the decedent’s holographic will. The pocketbook
apparently did not contain any other valuable papers or effects. However,
there was another pocketbook across the room hanging on the back of the
decedent’s bedroom door. That pocketbook contained valuable papers such
as the deed to the decedent’s home. 73
The In re Will of Church court held that the pocketbook hanging
inside the decedent’s bedroom closet qualified as an “other safe place” to
keep a holographic will.74 The court’s analysis was succinct and focused
almost exclusively on the fact that “the testator stored valuable belongings
in her pocketbooks, which she kept in her bedroom.” 75 Thus, the analysis
appears to be highly subjective—as long as the testator considers a similar
place to be safe, then that place meets the statutory requirement for a “safe
place.” However, the evidence relied upon by the court—that the decedent
kept other valuable documents in a similar place—leads to almost circular
results. If the safeness of a location is measured by whether the decedent
thought it was safe, and whether the decedent thought it was safe is
measured by whether the decedent keeps valuables in a similar location,
then necessarily anywhere similar to a place in which the decedent keeps
her valuables is a “safe place.” This result seems to ignore that some places
are objectively unsafe, regardless of whether or not a decedent routinely
stores valuables there.
3. In the Possession or Custody of a Third Party for Safekeeping
When a holograph is deposited with a third party, the critical inquiry
is whether it was done so “for safekeeping.” 76 In order for it to be a valid
will, some sort of instruction must usually accompany the deposit; simply
giving the document to a third party is insufficient to meet the statutory

70. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 148 N.C. 453, 454, 62 S.E. 553, 554 (1908) (noting that
decedent stored his holograph in an iron safe in his dental office along with other valuables).
71. 121 N.C. App. 506, 466 S.E.2d 297 (1996).
72. Id. at 507, 466 S.E.2d at 297.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 509, 466 S.E.2d at 298.
75. Id.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3) (2017).
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requirement. For example, a decedent mailing a letter containing
handwritten testamentary statements to his attorney did not qualify as “for
safekeeping” when there was no language indicating that the attorney
should preserve it. 77
In addition to depositing a holographic will with a third-party
individual, the statute also authorizes depositing a holographic will with a
“firm or corporation” for safekeeping. 78 Although interpretation of this
clause is scarce, one surely acceptable location to deposit a holographic
will is in the will depository maintained by the clerk of each county’s
superior court. 79
II. LOCATION AND AUTHENTICATING HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
North Carolina’s status as the sole domestic jurisdiction that requires
valid holographic wills to be located in particular places at the time of the
testator’s death raises questions regarding whether the location requirement
is founded upon sound policy considerations. These questions arise
specifically with respect to the court’s task of authenticating wills, a
process during which the court must decide whether the testator intended a
purported will to be a legally effective expression of her estate plan. 80 In
some instances, a purported will is not an authentic expression of
testamentary intent because it was prepared as a rough draft, which the
testator intended to reconsider and revise prior to giving her final assent to
its effectiveness.81 Alternatively, a purported will might be inauthentic
77. See In re Will of Mucci, 287 N.C. 26, 31, 213 S.E.2d 207, 211 (1975) (“There is nothing
to indicate that [the decedent] intended for [the attorney] to keep the letter, preserve it, or treat it
differently than he would any other letter. That [the decedent] simply mailed the letter to his
attorney and executor is not enough for a jury to infer that he had placed it with him for
safekeeping as a codicil.”); see also In re Will of Bennett, 180 N.C. 5, 10, 103 S.E. 917, 919
(1920) (“This letter bears no evidence on its face, nor is there any proof otherwise that [the
decedent] intended that it should be deposited with the propounder, or any one else, for safe
keeping.”).
78. § 31-3.4(a)(3).
79. Id. § 31-11 (requiring the clerk of each county’s superior court “to keep a receptacle or
depository in which any person who desires to do so may file that person’s will for safekeeping”);
see also JOHN P ARKER HUGGARD, NORTH C AROLINA ESTATE SETTLEMENT PRACTICE GUIDE
§ 21:17 (2d ed. 2013) (“The Clerk of every county in North Carolina has a wills receptacle that is
available for use without cost by any person who desires to have his will safeguarded.”).
80. See In re Will of Mucci, 287 N.C. at 30, 213 S.E.2d at 210 (“Before any instrument can
be probated as a testamentary disposition there must be evidence that it was written animo
testandi, or with testamentary intent. The maker must intend at the time of making that the paper
itself operate as a will . . . .”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 650 (2014) (“A will that is authentic and volitional is
entitled to probate. The testator’s estate must be distributed in accordance with the terms of the
will.”).
81. See Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 16, at 1065 (“[M]any persons are
given to speak and write off the cuff, many persons commit to words tentative drafts of their wills
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because it was not prepared by the testator but was instead forged by a
wrongdoer attempting to fraudulently benefit from the testator’s estate. 82 In
either instance, the testator did not possess testamentary intent with respect
to the purported will, and consequently the document should not be given
legal effect.
Because the testator is dead at the time of probate, the issue of
testamentary intent is not necessarily easy for the court to determine.83 If
the testator were alive, she could simply testify regarding her intent, and
little doubt would remain regarding a will’s authenticity. 84 However,
because such testimony is unavailable, the probate court must rely on other
evidence of testamentary intent. To address this evidentiary difficulty, the
law generally requires the testator to comply with various formalities
during her life, which supply the court with evidence of testamentary intent
that can be considered after her death. 85
As explained previously, the formalities for a formal attested will
include a written document, the testator’s signature, and the signatures of
two witnesses.86 These formalities are intended to provide the probate court
with ample evidence of the testator’s intent that the will be legally
effective.87 Because the testator likely would not go through the process of
complying with these formalities without intending the document to be
legally effective, the court can safely presume that a formally compliant
will is authentic. 88 Moreover, these formalities make it more difficult for a

and then have second thoughts when the time for inking draws near.”); John H. Langbein,
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 H ARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1975) (explaining that
“the danger exists that [the testator] may make seeming testamentary dispositions . . . without . . .
finality of intention” and observing that “[n]ot every expression that ‘I want you to have the
house when I’m gone’ is meant as a will”).
82. See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597,
618 (2014) (recognizing the possibility of “the fraudulent admission of a will that the testator
never executed”).
83. See Sitkoff, supra note 80, at 646–47 (“A will is a peculiar legal instrument . . . in that it
does not take effect until after the testator dies. As a consequence, probate courts follow what has
been called a ‘worst evidence’ rule of procedure. The witness who is best able to [provide
evidence of intent] is dead by the time the court considers such issues.”).
84. In a few states, a testator may settle the issue of a will’s authenticity while she is alive
through a process known as antemortem probate. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at
309.
85. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 492 (“The primary purpose of the Wills Act has always
been to provide the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent . . . ; virtually all the
formalities serve as ‘probative safeguards.’”).
86. See SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5 at 142–43.
87. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 492.
88. See Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 311 n.18
(2011) (“Few people would undergo [the will execution] ceremony without holding testamentary
intent.”); Sitkoff, supra note 80, at 647 (“A competent person not subject to undue influence,
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potential wrongdoer to pass a forgery through probate, which reduces the
concern that a purported will is fraudulent.89
Similarly, the formalities with which a testator must comply to
execute a valid holographic will are intended to provide the court with
evidence of testamentary intent. 90 Like the signature requirement for
attested wills, the requirement that the testator sign a holographic will
provides the court evidence that the testator gave her final assent to the
document and therefore intended it to be a legally effective expression of
her estate plan. 91 Additionally, the requirement that a holographic will be
handwritten by the testator provides evidence that the document was
actually prepared by the testator, thereby reducing the risk that the will is
fraudulent.92 In these ways, a testator’s compliance with will execution
formalities, whether in the context of an attested will or a holographic will,
provides the court evidence that a purported will is authentic.
Just as the writing, signature, and witnessing formalities of attested
wills and the signature and handwriting formalities of holographic wills are
designed to provide evidence of testamentary intent, North Carolina’s
location requirement for holographic wills is also meant to provide
evidence that the testator intended the will to be legally effective. 93 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina expressly drew the connection between
the location requirement and testamentary intent when it explained:
With regard, moreover, to holographic instruments, the necessary
animo testandi must appear not only from the instrument itself and
the circumstances under which it was made, but also from the fact
that the instrument was found among the deceased’s valuable papers
duress, or fraud is unlikely to execute an instrument in strict compliance with all of the Wills Act
formalities unless the person intends the instrument to be his or her will.”).
89. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51
YALE L.J. 1, 9–13 (1941); Langbein, supra note 81, at 496–97.
90. See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic
Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 124–25 (2006) (“The rationale for allowing holographic wills largely
focuses on the evidentiary function—the notion that the testator’s handwriting provides evidence
of genuineness and protection against forgery.”); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 89, at 13 (“The
exemption of holographic wills from the usual statutory requirements seems almost exclusively
justifiable in terms of the evidentiary function.”).
91. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 492–93.
92. See id. at 498 (“Handwriting has but one virtue: it provides superior evidence of
genuineness.”). The extent to which the handwriting requirement reduces the risk of forgery is
debatable. See Reid Kress Weisbord & David Horton, Inheritance Forgery, 69 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2019/2020) (manuscript at 11) (on file with authors).
93. See Theresa A. Bruno, The Deployment Will, 47 A.F. L. REV. 211, 231 (1999) (“The
statutory purpose for this location requirement was to provide some indication whether the
testator wanted the purported document to be considered the last will and testament.”); Natale,
supra note 15, at 199 (“The purpose of this requirement is to provide further evidence of
testamentary intent.”).
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after his death or in the possession of some person with whom the
deceased deposited for safekeeping. 94
Although the court did not explain how a will’s location provides
evidence of testamentary intent, the rationale is that if the testator thought
the document was of such importance that it should be stored in a safe
place or among things of value, then she likely considered the document to
be legally significant. 95
While will execution formalities undoubtedly provide some evidence
of testamentary intent, deciding whether a particular formality should be
required necessitates a more nuanced analysis than simply stating that the
formality is of evidentiary significance. Indeed, policymakers should
pursue two primary goals when deciding whether a particular will
execution formality should be a requisite for a valid will: accuracy and
efficiency.96
The first inquiry relates to how well the formality contributes to the
accuracy of the will authentication process. The primary goal of the law of
wills is to fulfill the testator’s intent, 97 and as such, any method of will

94. In re Will of Mucci, 287 N.C. 26, 30–31, 213 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1975).
95. See In re Will of Gilkey, 256 N.C. 415, 420, 124 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1962) (“The
requirement that the writing be found after death among testatrix’s valuable papers was to show
the author’s evaluation of the document, important because lodged with important documents, to
become effective upon death because left there by the author . . . .”); Alston v. Davis, 118 N.C.
202, 211, 24 S.E. 15, 17 (1896) (“Where a testator puts away a paper among his valuable papers,
or gives it to another for safe-keeping, it is evidence that he wishes it preserved, in order that it
may serve the purpose, after his death, for which it purports to have been written.”); Winstead v.
Bowman, 68 N.C. 170, 176 (1873) (“[T]he script must be found among such papers and effects as
show that the deceased considered it a paper of value, one deliberately made and to be preserved,
and intended to have effect as a will.”); Bruno, supra note 93, at 231 (“Serving as evidence of
intent, the location among valuable papers demonstrates the testator’s evaluation of the
importance of the document.”); Emily Robey-Phillips, Reducing Litigation Costs for Holographic
Wills, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 314, 327 (2017) (explaining that a holographic will’s location
“can shed light on how the decedent viewed the document” and that a “document treated as
valuable suggests that its author had intended it to have legal effect”); Claude W. Stimson, Note,
When Is a Holographic Will Dated?, 5 MONT. L. REV. 82, 87 (1944) (“The fact that a testator
considers the document sufficiently valuable to keep with his valuable effects indicates a sort of
testamentary intent.”).
96. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 141–42 (“The main purpose of these
formalities is to enable a court easily and reliably to assess the authenticity of a purported act of
testation.” (emphases added)).
97. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & O THER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (AM. L AW INST. 2003) (“The main function of the law in this field is to facilitate rather
than regulate. The law serves this function by establishing rules under which sufficiently reliable
determinations can be made regarding the content of the donor’s intention.”); Sitkoff, supra note
80, at 644 (“For the most part . . . , the American law of succession facilitates, rather than
regulates, the carrying out of the decedent’s intent. Most of the law of succession is concerned
with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this, giving
effect to the decedent’s probable intent.”).
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authentication should strive to accurately distinguish authentic wills from
those that are inauthentic. 98
Accuracy, however, is not the only goal that policymakers should
consider when crafting a will authentication process; the efficiency of the
process should be considered alongside the process’s accuracy. Acquiring
and evaluating the evidence necessary to make accurate decisions can be
costly in terms of the time, money, and effort expended litigating the issue
of testamentary intent. 99 Policymakers should therefore consider how a
particular formality either eases or increases the burden of making
authenticity decisions and ultimately should ensure that the cost of making
accurate authenticity decisions does not outweigh the benefit of those
decisions.100 By systematically evaluating the costs and benefits of a will
authentication process in this way, policymakers can gain insight into how
the law should authenticate wills and, in particular, whether North
Carolina’s location requirement for holographic wills should be part of that
process.
A.

Accuracy

The primary goal of any method of will authentication should be to
make accurate decisions regarding a will’s authenticity. 101 The law should
therefore strive to minimize the risk of inaccurate authenticity decisions,
which include both false positive outcomes and false negative outcomes. A
false positive outcome occurs in the context of will authentication when the
court decides that a will is authentic when it is in fact inauthentic. 102
Conversely, a false negative outcome occurs when the court determines
that a will is inauthentic when the testator truly intended it to be legally

98. See Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search
for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 467
(2002) (“[T]he objective . . . should be to determine as accurately as possible whether or not the
decedent had testamentary intent.”).
99. See Robey-Phillips, supra note 95, at 316 (“[T]he testator’s family and friends incur the
costs of litigation—time and money—at an emotionally trying time. Additionally, excess
litigation takes up sparse judicial resources, harming the judicial system.”).
100. See James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (1992) (“[W]e
should ask . . . whether [a method of will authentication] promotes the intent of the testator at an
acceptable administrative cost.”); Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act Compliance and the Harmless Error
Approach: Flawed Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR. L. REV. 337, 390 (2017) (“The
challenge in creating and applying a Wills Act is how to balance the competing public policy
consideration of testator’s intent, costs of administration, and potential for misconduct.”).
101. See Sherwin, supra note 98, at 467.
102. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 880 (2012) (“False positives (or Type I errors) involve probating
documents that are not animated by testamentary intent . . . .”); Sitkoff, supra note 80, at 647
(stating that “a false positive” involves “a spurious finding of authenticity”).
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effective.103 Under both scenarios, the court makes an incorrect authenticity
decision, and therefore the most accurate will authentication process would
minimize the combined risk of false positive outcomes and false negative
outcomes.
Because minimization of inaccurate authenticity decisions is a primary
goal of any method of will authentication, the first consideration relevant to
an analysis of North Carolina’s location requirement is how it contributes
to the accuracy of the will authentication process. As discussed previously,
the fact that a purported holographic will is discovered among the testator’s
valuable papers or in some secure location provides some assurance that
the testator considered the document to be valuable and worthy of
preservation, which, in turn, suggests that the testator also likely considered
the document to be a legally effective will. 104 Thus, when a purported
holographic will is discovered in one of the places mandated by the
location requirement, a finding of authenticity carries a reduced risk of
producing a false positive outcome.
Although the requirement that a will be found among the testator’s
valuable papers or other safe place likely reduces the risk of false positive
outcomes, policymakers must also consider how the location requirement
affects the risk of false negative outcomes. In contrast to false positive
outcomes, which occur when an inauthentic will is validated despite the
satisfaction of the location requirement, 105 a false negative outcome occurs
when an authentic will is invalidated because it does not satisfy the location
requirement.106 Because the location requirement is mandatory, all
purported holographic wills that are not discovered in one of the prescribed
locations are invalid. 107 This is potentially problematic because anytime the
law requires the testator to comply with some sort of technicality, there is a
risk that a well-meaning decedent’s intended will suffers invalidation based
on a mistaken failure to comply with the technicality. 108 In this regard, the

103. See Kelly, supra note 102, at 880 (“False negatives (or Type II errors) involve not
probating documents that are animated by testamentary intent . . . .”); Sitkoff, supra note 80, at
647 (stating that a “false negative” occurs when a will is denied probate despite “overwhelming
evidence of authenticity”).
104. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
105. See Kelly, supra note 102, at 880; Sitkoff, supra note 80, at 647.
106. See Kelly, supra note 102, at 880; Sitkoff, supra note 80, at 647.
107. See Natale, supra note 15, at 200 (“Failure to satisfy this requirement, as with other
statutory formalities, results in invalidation of the will.”).
108. See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of
Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. C ITY U. L. REV. 411, 431–34 (2009) (“[W]ill
formalities are barriers to the valid execution of a will. Put differently, absent formalities,
testators would more easily exercise their testamentary power.”); Sherwin, supra note 98, at 457
(“[F]ormality rules for will execution prevent mistakes about intent and provide a means for
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location requirement is a technical hurdle,109 just like any other will
execution formality, that can trip up the unwary testator and render an
authentic will invalid, thereby presenting a risk of false negative outcomes.
Given the nature of holographic wills, the location requirement is a
particularly onerous and worrisome technicality. Indeed, there are a variety
of reasons why an authentic holograph might not be discovered in a place
that satisfies the requirement. 110 First, the vast majority of holographic wills
are prepared without the assistance of legal counsel, 111 and, as such,
testators who leave behind holographic wills likely are unaware of the
location requirement. 112 The general public’s knowledge of the
particularities of the law of succession is questionable, 113 and the
unfamiliarity of the location requirement for holographic wills likely is

expressing intent. At the same time, in a significant number of cases they may frustrate not only
an individual testator’s intent but also the principal objective of the law of wills.”).
109. See Natale, supra note 15, at 200 (“While the ‘valuable papers or effects’ requirement is
designed to provide evidence of testamentary intent, it imposes an additional technical
requirement upon testators who wish to execute a valid holographic will.”).
110. See Robey-Phillips, supra note 95, at 331 (“[O]ne can imagine a variety of
circumstances in which a valid holograph might fail to make its way to safekeeping or the
testator’s valuable papers.”).
111. See Brown, supra note 90, at 122 (“[T]he majority of holographic wills are drafted by
lay people . . . .”); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments,
85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683, 733 (2011) (“[T]he holographic will removes the attorney
draftsperson from the process.”); see also Langbein, supra note 81, at 524 (“Today lawyers in
holograph jurisdictions have their clients’ wills executed as attested wills; that is, they opt for
maximum formality . . . .”).
112. See Natale, supra note 15, at 200 (“Although the merits of the testamentary intent
requirement are apparent, holographic wills may be denied probate merely because a testator was
ignorant of the requirements of the law, or because he neglected or forgot to place the will among
his valuable papers or effects or in the possession of another entity for safekeeping.”).
Unfamiliarity with estate planning and the surrounding law might be a particularly likely trait of
testators who execute holographic wills. See Clowney, supra note 4, at 47 (“Skeptics suggest that
laymen need help navigating the details of local estate law. The wills uncovered in Allegheny
County provide brick and mortar support for this position. Without question, homemade
testaments betray their authors’ lack of familiarity with basic tenets of professional estate
planning. The data show that laymen routinely craft flawed legal documents.”).
113. See Boni-Saenz, supra note 14, at 338–39 (“One may have the motivation to engage in
estate planning but lack the resources to do so effectively. . . . One important resource is the
specialized legal knowledge about formalistic inheritance law doctrines. This includes not only
substantive knowledge of the body of law in a given state but also knowledge of how to
communicate one’s donative preferences in a way that is intelligible to the state’s probate
system. . . . [B]ecause donors are one-time players in the game of life and death, . . . this type of
knowledge is likely to be rare in the population.”); see also Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 89, at
12 (“It is extremely improbable that laymen would be aware of the legal rules concerning the
competency of attesting witnesses without legal advice . . . .”); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in
Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1055 (2004)
(“Intestacy law is . . . relatively obscure.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 906 (2012) (“[T]he testamentary process is
obscure, unfamiliar, and complex.”).
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particularly acute given the uniqueness of the requirement to North
Carolina.114
Furthermore, testators of holographic wills are ordinarily less affluent
than those who execute attested wills. 115 Accordingly, even if a testator is
aware of the location requirement, she might not have a safe-deposit box in
which to store her holograph, or she might not have other valuable papers
or many valuable effects with which to place it. Other testators execute
holographic wills due to isolation. 116 Attested wills require witnesses, and if
the testator cannot find individuals whom she is comfortable serving as
witnesses, then she likely also lacks individuals whom she trusts to
safeguard her will. Finally, some testators execute holographic wills in
emergencies.117 In such situations, not only might the testator lack the
opportunity to comply with the formalities for attested wills, 118 but she
might also lack the opportunity to comply with the location requirement. 119
114. Of course, some laymen will be aware of the location requirement. See, e.g., In re Will
of Groce, 196 N.C. 373, 375, 145 S.E. 689, 690 (1928) (“Deceased had also said, a short time
before his death, to a neighbor, that ‘a man could make a will, and not have witnesses. He could
put it with his papers and the neighbors could swear to his handwriting.’” (emphasis added)).
115. See Clowney, supra note 4, at 45 (“Despite the remarkable wealth of a few, careful
examination of the record reveals that many of the very poorest willmakers also gravitate toward
holographs. Over 20% of testators in this study died with less than $10,000 in net probate assets.
All in all, it seems that while holographs have become an essential tool for testators with modest
assets, the claim that handmade testaments amount to ‘trailer park wills’ still carries some
water.”).
116. See Horton, Wills Law, supra note 4, 1137–38 (reporting an example of a holographic
will that “begins by declaring that ‘[s]ince it is too hard finding willing witnesses to sign my will,
I am rewriting the entire will by hand’” (alteration in original)); C. Douglas Miller, Will
Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform
Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, Part Two:
Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503 and a Counterproposal, 43 FLA. L. REV. 599, 629–30
(1991) (“[G]iving testators the option of executing a holographic will may reflect legislative
intent to permit a limited exception to the attestation requirement in order to . . . protect the
occasional testator who is unable or unwilling to procure witnesses.”); Robey-Phillips, supra note
95, at 315 (“Because no witnesses are required [for a holographic will], isolated people can access
testacy.”).
117. See Clowney, supra note 4, at 58 (“Fully 10% of the holographs discovered in Allegheny
County constituted . . . deathbed wills.”); Horton, Wills Law, supra note 4, at 1137 (explaining
that holographs facilitate “emergency room wills: spontaneous dispositions by those in dire
straits”).
118. See Clowney, supra note 4, at 58 (“In the emergency room and on the operating table,
testators may handwrite their last wishes because they lack the time to find witnesses or discuss
things with an attorney.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, Christopher J. Walker & Ben HernandezStern, The Inheritance Process in San Bernardino County, California, 1964: A Research Note, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1445, 1466 (2007) (“Many of the holographs were written within days of death—
they were almost literally death-bed wills, which may explain why there was no time for lawyers,
witnesses, or typewriters.”).
119. In one famous case, a dying farmer used a pocketknife to etch his holographic will into
the fender of the tractor under which he was pinned. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5,
at 209.
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Therefore, while the location of a holographic will is relevant to the issue
of testamentary intent, requiring that a holographic will be located in a
particular place presents a risk that the law will invalidate truly authentic
wills.
At times, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized that the
location requirement limits the testator’s ability to leave behind a legally
effective holographic will and consequently presents a risk of generating
false negative outcomes.120 For example, in a nineteenth-century opinion,
the court explained, “[I]t is objected that a construction which would reject
a paper, found under the circumstances proved in this case, is too strict, and
may disappoint the intention of many persons who wished, and intended to
die testate.”121 While the court acknowledged this concern, it summarily
dismissed it when it stated that such a construction “will be more likely to
uphold the policy of the statute in its attempt to prevent heirs, and next of
kin, from being deprived of their just rights,” which is “the beneficent
purpose of the statute.”122 In this excerpt, the court identified minimization
of false positive outcomes as the objective of the location requirement
because the protection of heirs and next of kin is achieved by ensuring that
only those wills that are extremely likely to be authentic are validated.
While the court seemed to correctly identify the policy objective of the
location requirement, it did not accurately characterize the merit of that
policy, at least not under modern conditions. 123
Because the overarching goal of the law of wills is to carry out the
testator’s intent, 124 the court correctly characterized avoiding false positive
outcomes as a “beneficent purpose.” 125 However, the court ignored the
120. See Winstead v. Bowman, 68 N.C. 170, 176 (1873) (suggesting that “[t]he policy of our
statute seems to have been to restrict the facility with which testamentary papers were allowed
probate in the English Courts” but cautioning that “[i]t was not the intention of the Legislature to
destroy, or unreasonably restrict, the power of making a holographic will; but simply to assure
that the writing offered as a will was really and deliberately intended as such”).
121. Little v. Lockman, 49 N.C. 494, 498 (1857).
122. Id.
123. In earlier times, false positive outcomes might have been more costly than false negative
outcomes, and consequently, a nineteenth-century court focusing exclusively on the location
requirement’s protection against false positive outcomes may be justified. However, in modern
times, the cost of false positive outcomes and false negative outcomes are more equal, and
therefore a will authentication process should strive to minimize the combined risk of error. See
generally Mark Glover, Probate-Error Costs, 49 CONN. L. REV. 613, 643 (2016) (“[U]nder
current conditions, probate-error costs are now more symmetric than they once were.”).
124. See Whitehurst v. Gotwalt, 189 N.C. 577, 580, 127 S.E. 582, 584 (1925) (“It is the duty
of the courts to effectuate the intention of the testator, and this is the cardinal principle in the
interpretation of wills to which all other rules must bend, unless that intention be contrary to
public policy or the settled rules of law.”); RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
125. Little, 49 N.C. at 498.
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equally laudable goal of avoiding false negative outcomes. As explained at
the outset, incorrect authenticity decisions are reached both when the court
validates an inauthentic will (i.e., a false positive outcome) and when it
invalidates an authentic will (i.e., a false negative outcome). 126 Both types
of incorrect authenticity decisions undermine the testator’s intent, and,
therefore, protection against false positives outcomes should not be favored
over protection against false negative outcomes.127 By exclusively praising
the requirement’s minimization of false positive outcomes, the court failed
to consider that the requirement also produces a potentially significant risk
of false negative outcomes.
Due to this heightened risk of false negative outcomes, the location
requirement is problematic from an evidentiary perspective; however, it
might have merit from a protective standpoint. Instead of simply providing
evidence that the testator viewed the purported holographic will as a legally
effective document, the location requirement might increase the accuracy
of the will authentication process by reducing the risk that a purported
holographic will is a forgery. 128 In an early opinion, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina specifically referenced the protective function of the
location requirement by stating that the requirement contributes to “the
protection of the heirs-at-law, and next of kin of a decedent, from the effect
of a forged or false paper as a will.” 129
Theoretically, the location requirement makes a wrongdoer’s task
more difficult. With this additional requirement in place, a fraudster must
not only produce a document that appears to be written and signed by the
hand of the purported testator but also place that forgery in a location that
indicates the purported testator intended to preserve and protect the forgery.
By establishing an additional hurdle over which a prospective wrongdoer
must pass, the location requirement might reduce the likelihood that a
fraudulent will is probated, thereby decreasing the risk of false positive
outcomes.

126. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
127. See Sherwin, supra note 98, at 463 (“[A]n erroneous decision upholding an informal will
is [not] substantially more costly than an erroneous decision rejecting an informal will . . .
[because] an error either way results in a disposition the testator does not want.”); Sitkoff, supra
note 80, at 647 (“Both kinds of error dishonor the decedent’s freedom of disposition. [A false
positive outcome] gives effect to a false expression of testamentary intent; [a false negative
outcome] denies effect to a true expression of testamentary intent.”).
128. See R. Gray Williams, Some Suggested Changes in the Law of Wills in Virginia, 2 VA. L.
REG. (n.s.) 401, 406 (1916) (“North Carolina . . . offer[s] additional safeguards against forgery by
the provision that the holograph document must be found in the valuable papers of the deceased
or lodged with a third person for safekeeping.”).
129. Little, 49 N.C. at 496.
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Given that the location requirement produces a substantial risk of false
negative outcomes,130 the protection from forgery and the attendant
reduction in the risk of false positive outcomes must be significant in order
for the location requirement to increase the overall accuracy of the will
authentication process. However, for two pragmatic reasons, the protective
merit of the location requirement is questionable, and as such, any
theoretical improvement in the authentication process’s accuracy is
doubtful. First, it seems unlikely that the location requirement would serve
as a meaningful obstacle for a determined wrongdoer. 131 To be sure, if the
location requirement were restricted to a safe-deposit box, then perhaps a
potential perpetrator of fraud would find it significantly more difficult to
obtain access to the prescribed location. 132 However, the location
requirement is not so limited.
Consider, for instance, the possibility that a purported holographic
will is in the possession of someone other than the testator at the time of the
testator’s death. If the court determines that the testator deposited the will
with that individual for safekeeping, then the location requirement is
satisfied. However, one who forges a holographic will could perpetuate the
fraudulent scheme by claiming that the testator gave the document to her
for safekeeping or by recruiting a conspirator to take possession of the
forgery.133 Likewise, consider the possibility that a purported holograph is
discovered among the testator’s valuable papers. If a wrongdoer lodges a
forged holographic will among the testator’s effects during the testator’s
life, then the possibility exists that the testator will discover the forgery and
destroy it. However, the wrongdoer could attempt to place the forgery
130. See supra notes 105–27 and accompanying text.
131. The same point has been used to question the protective function of other will execution
formalities. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 496 (“The attestation formalities are pitifully
inadequate to protect the testator from determined crooks . . . .”); James Lindgren, Abolishing the
Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 555 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren,
Abolishing] (“Because it is fairly easy to find two agreeable witnesses, very little fraud, duress, or
undue influence is prevented. Most crooks are careful enough not to be tripped up by a simple
formality.”).
132. See Lindgren, Abolishing, supra note 131, at 571 (suggesting that one “way to handle
unwitnessed wills would be to require some special proof to establish them” and more
particularly that “[t]hose more concerned about forgery” might prefer that “a will’s genuineness”
be established by the fact “that it was found in the testator’s safety deposit box”); Robey-Phillips,
supra note 95, at 331 (“If the document is discovered . . . in [the testator’s] safe-deposit box . . .
and meets both the handwriting and signature formalities, a presumption of validity should
arise.”). But see Weisbord & Horton, supra note 92, at 42 (“In case after case, the proponent of a
sham will claims to have ‘discovered’ it in a file cabinet or a safe deposit box . . . .”).
133. This scenario can arise even in jurisdictions that do not have a location requirement for
wills. See Weisbord & Horton, supra note 92, at 42 (“In one far-fetched scheme, a woman
contended that the testator entrusted her with the [sham] will, inexplicably told her to ‘keep it
confidential,’ and did not bat an eyelash when she proceeded to ‘roam the world’ with the
document inside her motor home.”).
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among the testator’s valuable papers after the testator’s death. Under all of
these scenarios, the protective function of the location requirement is
undermined by a determined wrongdoer whose fraudulent scheme includes
not only producing a forgery but also depositing the forgery in a place that
satisfies the location requirement.
The second reason why the location requirement’s protective function
likely does not significantly reduce the risk of false positive outcomes is
that there is little risk of forgery in the absence of the location requirement.
Scholars and judges have long suggested that the handwriting requirement
already provides robust protection against forged wills because it ensures
that persuasive evidence exists that the testator actually prepared the
document.134 Empirical evidence supports this theory, as probate data from
Pennsylvania reveals that few concerns are raised during the probate of
holographic wills regarding the possibility of fraud or other types of
wrongdoing that could bear on the issue of testamentary intent. 135
In sum, North Carolina’s policymakers have serious reason to
question whether the state’s idiosyncratic location requirement for
holographic wills increases the accuracy of the will authentication process.
Although the requirement likely reduces the risk of false positive outcomes
by mandating that the testator leave behind an additional piece of evidence
regarding testamentary intent, it also likely increases the risk of false
134. See In re Dreyfus’ Estate, 165 P. 941, 941 (Cal. 1917) (“There can be no doubt that
[holographic will statutes] owe[] [their] origin[s] to the fact that a successful counterfeit of
another’s handwriting is exceedingly difficult, and that therefore the requirement that it should be
in the testator’s handwriting would afford protection against a forgery . . . .”); Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 89, at 13 (“The requirement that a holographic will be entirely written in the
handwriting of the testator furnishes more complete evidence for inspection by handwriting
experts than would exist if only the signature were available, and consequently tends to preclude
the probate of a forged document.”); Lindgren, Abolishing, supra note 131, at 558 (“Handwriting
merely provides a larger handwriting sample, which reduces the chance of forgery.”). But see
Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 827 (2014) [hereinafter Hirsch, Formalizing] (“Once upon a time, people
corresponded by posted letter, often written out longhand. Expert witnesses could compare the
handwriting found in a holographic will with other documents shown to have been penned in the
testator’s hand. In the age of e-mail and telephonic texting, however, the handwriting that appears
in a holograph could lose its probative value—the testator might leave behind few other samples
of his or her handwriting with which the holograph can be compared.”).
135. See Clowney, supra note 4, at 60 (“Of particular note, the record suggests that neither
forgery nor deceit poses a significant threat to the integrity of do-it-yourself willmaking; this
study found no evidence of counterfeit documents and turned up only one allegation of undue
influence.”); see also Lindgren, Abolishing, supra note 131, at 558 (“[F]orged wills are rare.”);
Weisbord & Horton, supra note 92, at 35 (“[W]e found only two decisions that held that a
holograph was forged. . . . Apparently, despite the questionable reliability of forensic handwriting
analysis, forgers remain sufficiently concerned about the possibility of detection to prefer
typewritten forgeries that require handwritten fabrication of only the decedent’s signature.”). But
see John J. Harris, Genuine or Forged?, 32 CAL. S T. B.J. 658, 660 (1957) (“Most [forged] wills
are holographic.”).
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negative outcomes because many testators of holographic wills lack the
knowledge and opportunity to comply with the requirement. Ultimately,
because it indiscriminately invalidates truly authentic wills that are not
discovered in one of the prescribed locations, the requirement’s role in
increasing the accuracy of the will authentication process is questionable at
best, and, at worst, it might actually decrease the accuracy of the process.
B.

Efficiency

The second primary goal of any method of will authentication is to
provide courts with an efficient way to distinguish authentic wills from
inauthentic wills.136 Indeed, policymakers should ensure that the benefits of
making accurate authenticity decisions are not offset by the costs of making
those decisions.137 For instance, if the law were to give probate courts
absolute discretion to make authenticity decisions, the will authentication
process could become burdensome. The court would be charged with
ascertaining the testator’s subjective intent, a task that would not
necessarily be easy.138 Direct observation of the testator’s intent is
impossible,139 and, because the testator is dead at the time of probate, the
testator’s testimony regarding her intent is unavailable. 140 As such, the
court would consider every piece of evidence that could bear on the issue
of testamentary intent, and, in turn, litigation regarding the authenticity of
wills might clog the probate system. 141
However, by directing probate courts to look for specific objective
evidence of testamentary intent in the form of a document that complies
with prescribed formalities, the law streamlines the courts’ decisionmaking
136. See Wendel, supra note 100, at 382 (“[O]ne of the important public policy
considerations . . . is . . . the costs of administration associated with ascertaining and giving effect
to testator’s intent.”). Indeed, policymakers should consider efficiency when crafting any type of
legal decisionmaking process. See Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 285, 367 (2017) [hereinafter Hirsch, Testation] (“Like other landscapes, the legal landscape
is an environment of scarce resources. The success and even wisdom of a rule depends in no
small measure on its frugality.”).
137. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
138. See Hirsch, Testation, supra note 136, at 287 (“The mind of a testator teems with data,
but data that is difficult to access, and assess, without risk of inaccuracy or misrepresentation.
Death compounds those risks.”).
139. See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 656
(1988) (referencing “the impossible search for subjective intent”); cf. Jan Klabbers, How to
Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 283, 303 (2001) (“[A]s a philosophical truism, it may be well-nigh
impossible to identify someone else’s subjective intent; to paraphrase an ancient maxim, not even
the devil knows what is inside a man’s head.”).
140. See Sitkoff, supra note 80, at 647.
141. See Guzman, supra note 88, at 316 (explaining that “an ad hoc, pure intent approach
would” produce a “vastly increased likelihood of . . . litigation”).
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process.142 No longer is the court’s focus the subjective issue of the
testator’s intent; instead, the court must decide the objective issue of
whether the testator complied with the prescribed formalities. 143 For
example, in the context of attested wills, the court need not consider all
potential evidence of testamentary intent but must simply look at the face
of the document and determine whether the signatures of the testator and
witnesses are present. 144 In some instances, questions regarding the
authenticity of the signatures might need to be resolved, but the court’s task
of evaluating these objective issues is generally easier to decide than the
subjective issue of the testator’s intent. 145 Moreover, when it comes to the
testator’s compliance with external formalities, a presumption of
testamentary intent is triggered if the testator complied, 146 or a presumption
of the lack of testamentary intent is triggered if the testator failed to
comply.147 These presumptions end the will authentication process in most
cases,148 which in turn limits the costs of litigating the issue of intent. 149
142. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 494 (“Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for
executing witnessed wills results in considerable uniformity in the organization, language, and
content of most wills. Courts are seldom left to puzzle whether the document was meant to be a
will.”); Lindgren, Abolishing, supra note 131, at 554 (“[F]ormalities channel almost all wills into
the same patterns, letting well-counseled testators know what they must do to execute a valid will,
reducing the administrative costs of determining which documents are wills, and thus increasing
the reliability of our system of testation.”).
143. See Hirsch, Testation, supra note 136, at 290 (“The essence of a will is testamentary
intent. This volitional attribute defines the category, distinguishing wills from other transfers of
property. Lawmakers need not, however, rely on a state-of-mind rule to discover intent. The
protocols accompanying a transfer could serve as an external standard to determine its
character.”).
144. In some states, the primary formalities of a writing, the testator’s signature and
attestation by two witnesses, are supplemented by ancillary formalities, such as the requirement
that the testator and witnesses be in each other’s presence at the time that they sign the will. See
SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 142–43. The court’s task of evaluating formal
compliance can be more difficult if issues arise regarding the presence requirement because the
court must consider extrinsic evidence regarding the will execution ceremony. See Thomas E.
Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J. 343, 358 (2016) (“[A] defect in the presence
requirement would only be ascertainable upon deposing the witnesses . . . .”).
145. The comparative ease of deciding the objective issue of formal compliance results from
the limited scope of the factual inquiry. See Hirsch, Testation, supra note 136, at 363–64
(“Thoughts cost more than a proverbial penny, but so too do other items of evidence. Lawmakers
can compare recourse to an external standard with a related state-of-mind rule and decide which
provides greater value (i.e., accuracy) for money. . . . When might we expect a state-of-mind rule
to prove comparatively efficient? The question could hinge on the scope of the factual inquiry
required to carry out objective policy. Where that inquiry is narrow, an external standard becomes
more reliable and cheaper to apply.”).
146. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 500 (explaining that the “fundamental requisite[]” of
“testamentary intent [is] presumed from due execution”).
147. See id. at 489 (“[O]nce a formal defect is found, Anglo-American courts . . . conclude[]
that the attempted will fails.”).
148. If the testator complies, the presumption of testamentary intent can be rebutted in some
circumstances, but arguments that formally compliant wills do not reflect testamentary intent are
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Like the formalities of attested wills, the formalities of holographic
wills streamline the process of authentication but in different ways and
perhaps to differing degrees. The requirement that the testator sign a will is
largely the same for both attested and holographic wills, 150 and
consequently the court’s task of evaluating the testator’s compliance likely
is not more difficult for one type over the other. 151 The requirement that the
testator write a holographic will by hand poses the same difficulty as the
signature requirement, as the court might be faced with questions regarding
whether the handwriting is truly the testator’s.152 However, both the
handwriting and signature formalities are objectively verifiable facts that
are generally easy for the court to determine.153 Importantly, the court need
rare. See infra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. If the testator fails to comply, the
presumption of the lack of testamentary intent is conclusive in most states, which means that the
court need not consider evidence that a non-complaint will is authentic. See Sitkoff, supra note
80, at 647–48.
149. See Hirsch, Testation, supra note 136, at 296 (“By calling on courts to judge a testator’s
volitional state of mind, we would impose on courts an evidentiary burden that raises their
decision costs. By barring such evidence, we would lessen those costs.”); see also Hirsch,
Formalizing, supra note 134, at 804 (“In economic terms, . . . we can justify the imposition of
expensive formalities on parties as functioning to avoid spillover costs—internalizing the
negative externality created by the state-supported construction proceedings for transfers
formulated in ambiguous ways.”); David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of
Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 577 (2017) (“[T]he need to prevent spillover
costs—not the desire to carry out the decedent’s intent—furnishes the most forceful reasons to
take the Wills Act at its letter.”).
150. One primary difference in the signature requirement for attested and holographic wills is
that an attested will can be signed by someone other than the testator who places the testator’s
name on the document at the direction of the testator, but a holographic will must be signed by
the testator’s own hand. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.3(b) (2017), with id. § 31-3.4(a)(2).
151. The signature requirement might occasionally be more difficult to decide for holographic
wills than for attested wills because testators sometimes sign holographic wills in an informal
manner, such as by using terms such as “Mom” or “Brother.” See, e.g., Wise v. Short, 181 N.C.
320, 321, 107 S.E. 134, 135 (1921) (involving a purported will signed “Brother Alex”); Hughes v.
Craddock, 207 N.C. App. 748, 701 S.E.2d 404, 2010 WL 4290228, at *7 (2010) (unpublished
table decision) (involving a purported will signed “Mom”). In these cases, the court must decide
not only whether the testator actually placed the mark on the document but also whether “the
maker adopted [the mark] as her own for the purpose of executing the instrument.” In re Will of
Southerland, 188 N.C. 325, 328, 124 S.E. 632, 633 (1924).
152. See, e.g., In re Will of Wall, 216 N.C. 805, 805, 5 S.E.2d 837, 837 (1939) (“The
significant controversy at the trial was as to whether [a portion of a purported holographic will]
was in the handwriting of the supposed testatrix.”).
153. Even when the necessary threshold of evidence differs between attested and holographic
wills, whether the formality requirements have been met remains a relatively easy matter for
courts to assess. For example, the testator’s handwriting and signature on a holographic will must
be supported by testimony from three witnesses. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2A-9(1) (2017). For an
attested will, various combinations of evidence are acceptable to prove the testator’s signature,
and the testimony of only two attesting witnesses is sufficient. Id. § 28A-2A-8(a). While it may
be easier for the propounder of a will to prove an attested will by bringing forth two witnesses
rather than three, it is no more or less difficult for a probate court to assess whether two or three
witnesses testified in support of the decedent’s signature.
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not immediately address the murkier, subjective issue of whether the
testator truly intended the purported holographic will to be legally
effective.
A finding that the testator complied with the formalities for
holographic wills, however, does not eliminate the need for the court to
consider the subjective issue of testamentary intent, as the testator’s
compliance with the signature and handwriting requirements is necessary,
but not sufficient, for the validity of holographic wills. 154 Because of the
informal nature of holographic wills, the testator’s compliance with
holographic will formalities does not trigger a presumption of testamentary
intent. Whereas, in most instances, formal attested wills are unquestionably
testamentary in nature because they are typically captioned the “last will
and testament” of the testator and clearly express testamentary gifts, 155
some purported holographic wills that comply with the prescribed
formalities are nonetheless not clearly testamentary in nature. They are not
clearly labeled as the testator’s will, 156 and they do not necessarily describe
the testator’s estate plan. 157 Thus, the court must still determine whether a
154. See In re Will of Mucci, 287 N.C. 26, 30, 213 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1975) (“With regard . . .
to holographic instruments, the necessary animo testandi must appear not only from the
instrument itself and the circumstances under which it was made, but also from the fact that the
instrument was found among the deceased’s valuable papers . . . .”); In re Will of Lamparter, 126
N.C. App. 593, 598, 486 S.E.2d 458, 461 (1997) (“In addition to the statutory requirements for a
holographic will, our Supreme Court has held that it is necessary to establish testamentary intent
. . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 348 N.C. 45, 497 S.E.2d 692 (1998).
155. See Guzman, supra note 88 at 311 n.18 (“[A] typical document would include the
caption ‘Last Will and Testament’ and continue restating the document’s purpose . . . .”); Karen J.
Sneddon, In the Name of God, Amen: Language in Last Wills and Testaments, 29 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 665, 694 (2011) (“The first characteristic of the genre of wills is the lyrical title ‘Last Will
and Testament.’ The title of the document conveys the ‘animus testandi,’ the testamentary
intention.”).
156. See Brown, supra note 90, at 110 (“[H]olographic wills invite suspicion as to the
existence of testamentary intent [because they] are often informal documents, such as letters or
memoranda, which lack any formal designation as a will or last testament.”). But see Clowney,
supra note 4, at 60 (“Nine times out of ten testators labeled their holographs ‘Last Will &
Testament’ or ‘My Will.’”). Some have suggested that policymakers could treat a label such as
“Last Will and Testament” as a will execution formality. See, e.g., Hirsch, Inheritance and
Inconsistency, supra note 16, at 1076 (“Lawmakers could . . . jettison the witnessing requirement,
but mandate that every will (including wholly handwritten ones) contain some other tangible
expression of formality, such as a testamentary heading on the document.”); Robey-Phillips,
supra note 95, at 331 (“If a document is handwritten in its material provisions, signed, and
labeled a will or testament, a presumption of validity should arise.”).
157. See Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 16, at 1073–74 (“[C]ourts must
contend with nettlesome questions concerning the intent of authors to render legally effective
holographic documents that are offered for probate as wills. (Those nettles are most prickly when
a holograph mixes testamentary declarations with ordinary communication, as when the alleged
will appears within a diary or a letter to the alleged beneficiary.).” (footnote omitted)). But see
Clowney, supra note 4, at 60 (“Even in cases where the documents submitted for probate lacked a
proper label, testators typically employed dispositive language [and] mentioned death . . . .”).
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purported holographic will expresses testamentary intent even though the
document is handwritten and signed. Despite this additional step in the
authentication process, the formalities for holographic wills streamline the
process because the initial formality analysis excludes all non-compliant
purported holographic wills from the secondary analysis of intent. 158 In this
way, reliance on formalities as evidence of intent promotes the efficiency
of the will authentication process.
Nonetheless, the fact that the court must undertake the secondary
analysis of whether the testator intended a formally compliant holographic
will to be legally effective should mean that there is significantly greater
opportunity for litigation than if the court simply focused on the testator’s
formal compliance. In reality, however, this is not necessarily the case. In
the context of attested wills, challengers in some jurisdictions have the
opportunity to question the testamentary intent of formally compliant
wills.159 In other words, the court’s finding that the testator complied with
the prescribed formalities does not foreclose litigation regarding the
subjective intent of the testator.160 Despite this opportunity, litigation of this
type is rare.161 Therefore, if the subset of wills that satisfy the formalities of
attested wills does not generate significant litigation regarding the
possibility that the testator did not truly intend the will be legally effective,
then perhaps the subset of wills that satisfy the formalities of holographic
wills does not generate significant litigation regarding the possibility that
the testator truly intended the will to be legally effective.

158. See Horton, Wills Law, supra note 4, at 1135 (explaining that “formality in the realm of
holographs has a clear upside” in that “it distinguishes holographs from the great mass of
typewritten, unattested, will-like writings” and suggesting that “[a]bandoning this convention
would make it even harder to determine whether a decedent set out to make a will”).
159. See Hirsch, Testation, supra note 136, at 292 (“As a matter of law, if the language of a
formalized writing fails to convey unambiguously whether or not it is intended to comprise a will,
all courts admit extrinsic evidence of the author’s state of mind to resolve the question. But when
the document on its face evinces testamentary intent, courts are divided. Some admit extrinsic
evidence to rebut a presumption of intent created by the document, while others bar such
evidence, relying on an external standard to judge intent.”).
160. See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground
of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 521, 541–42 (1982)
(“Testamentary intent is ordinarily inferred without difficulty . . . . When, however, there is such
an objection, the important point . . . is that most Anglo-American courts will consider the
objection on the merits, even though the objection must rest entirely on extrinsic evidence
contrary to the unambiguous language of the will.”).
161. See Hirsch, Testation, supra note 136, at 296 (“[A]s common sense and the sparsity of
cases suggest[,] most documents that look like wills are intended to be exactly what they seem.”);
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 160, at 541 (“[T]here is seldom any objection that a [formal
attested will] lacks testamentary intent.”).
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Whether holographic wills actually pose a greater risk of generating
litigation is an open question. 162 Empirical studies comparing litigation
rates in cases involving attested wills and those involving holographic wills
are inconclusive regarding whether the issue of testamentary intent is
costlier to decide for holographic wills. Some studies suggest that
holographic wills are more prone to litigation than attested wills, 163 but
others find that both types produce equivalent rates of litigation.164
Nonetheless, despite this uncertainty, the potential for increased litigation
rates is a primary concern that critics of holographic wills raise, 165 and it is
perhaps one reason why a large minority of states do not authorize
holographic wills.166
Within this context, the question is whether North Carolina’s location
requirement promotes the efficiency of the will authentication process.
Like the signature and handwriting requirements, the location requirement
directs the court to decide an objective issue. In particular, the court must
determine where the will was located at the time of the testator’s death.
This issue potentially is more difficult to decide than the signature and
handwriting requirements because it cannot be resolved simply by a review
of the document itself. Evidence of the will’s location must be considered,
and any factual disputes must be resolved through litigation. 167 However,
162. Compare Clowney, supra note 4, at 52–53 (“[Holographic wills] rarely are contested in
courtroom proceedings; in the overwhelming majority of cases, homemade testaments distribute a
decedent’s property without fuss or objection.”), with Hirsch, Formalizing, supra note 134, at 827
(“And in the absence of a ritual will execution ceremony, much litigation has also revolved
around whether an alleged holographic will was intended to be a final, legally operative
document.”).
163. See Horton, Wills Law, supra note 4, at 1134 (“Holographs do seem to spawn more than
their fair share of litigation. Of the 332 wills under my microscope, 32 (10 percent) were
handwritten. Yet of the thirty-five disputed testate matters, eight (23 percent) involved
holographs.”). Horton found that the primary issue of litigation regarding holographic wills was
“whether these documents were meant to be wills” rather than simply “letters [or] diary entries,”
as “five of the six contested holographs turned on that issue.” Id. But see Clowney, supra note 4,
at 60 (reporting that a different “study . . . failed to uncover any evidence of unscrupulous
potential heirs attempting to probate handwritten notes not intended as final testaments”).
164. See Clowney, supra note 4, at 59–61 (reporting that “[o]f the 145 holographic documents
submitted for probate in the years of study, only six (4%) resulted in a hearing or objection of any
kind” and noting that “[r]ecent studies have found that between 2% and 10% of formal witnessed
wills result in a courtroom tussle of some kind—findings abundantly similar to this study’s
analysis of holographs”).
165. See Robey-Phillips, supra note 95, at 314 (“[O]pponents argue that holographs produce
excessive litigation . . . .”); see also Brown, supra note 90, at 100 (“Holographic wills are
notoriously prone to challenge.”).
166. See Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 16, at 1072 n.42 (describing the
drafting process of the Uniform Probate Code and the role that the potential for litigation played
in the decision to authorize holographic wills).
167. Even though more signature and handwriting witnesses (three) are required than location
witnesses (one), see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2A-9 (2017), the task of evaluating the signature and
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the location of a will is an objective fact that generally presents little
difficulty for the court.
In contrast to the signature and handwriting requirements, the location
requirement also presents a subjective issue of intent. Indeed, beyond the
factual question of where the testator stored the will, the location
requirement raises thorny legal questions regarding such things as what
constitutes “among the testator’s valuable papers and effects” 168 and what
constitutes a “safe place.”169 North Carolina courts interpret these phrases
to refer to the subjective intent of the testator. 170 For instance, to determine
whether a purported holographic will was found among the testator’s
valuable papers, the court must first determine what papers the testator
considered to be valuable. 171 Litigation of this type is potentially
burdensome because resolution of these issues is highly dependent on the
particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. What is facially
an objective issue (where the will was located at the time of the decedent’s
death) can quickly devolve into a subjective one (whether the decedent
regarded the nearby papers or effects as valuable).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed that an analysis of
whether a will was found among the testator’s valuable papers focuses on
the subjective intent of the testator, and it acknowledged the breadth of
evidence that could bear on this issue when it explained:
The phrase cannot have a fixed and unvarying meaning to be applied
under all circumstances. It can only mean that the script must be
found among such papers and effects as show that the deceased
considered it a paper of value, one deliberately made and to be
preserved, and intended to have effect as a will. This would depend
greatly upon the condition, and business, and habits of the deceased
in respect to keeping valuable papers, and the place and
circumstances under which the script was executed . . . .172

handwriting boils down to inspecting the holograph itself and potentially comparing it to other
writings. The location requirement, however, is a matter of evidence that cannot be resolved by
inspecting the document. Rather, a dispute over the location of the document may amount to a
credibility determination between the conflicting accounts of two opposing witnesses.
168. See supra Section I.B.1.
169. See supra Section I.B.2.
170. See In re Will of Lamparter, 126 N.C. App. 593, 602, 486 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1997)
(Wynn, J., dissenting) (“Whether the place of discovery is ‘among valuable papers or effects or in
some other safe place’ is a factual question, the issue being whether the deceased considered the
papers valuable or the place a safe one.”), rev’d on other grounds, 348 N.C. 45, 497 S.E.2d 692
(1998).
171. See In re Will of Allen, 148 N.C. App. 526, 533, 559 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2002) (“The
determination of whether a will is found among valuable papers must be evaluated in the context
of what would likely be regarded by the decedent as valuable.”).
172. Winstead v. Bowman, 68 N.C. 170, 175–76 (1873).
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As the court makes clear, the location requirement does not limit the
court’s analysis to a determination of an objectively verifiable fact. 173
Instead, the location requirement shifts a court’s focus from one issue of
subjective intent (i.e., whether the testator intended a will to be legally
effective) to another issue of subjective intent (i.e., whether the testator
considered the will’s location to be among her valuable papers). By doing
so, the location requirement raises additional issues that a court must
consider in order to authenticate a holographic will, which, in turn,
provides a greater opportunity for litigation. Indeed, the location
requirement carries the potential to open exactly the types of inquiries—
ones that require a court to look into the mind of the testator—that
formalities are meant to minimize.
Thus, the location requirement does not further either of the two
primary goals of will authentication. First, the requirement likely does not
make the will authentication process more accurate. While the testator’s
compliance with the requirement certainly provides some evidence of
testamentary intent, a testator’s noncompliance with the requirement does
not necessarily provide evidence of the absence of testamentary intent.
Consequently, the requirement’s effect of invalidating all holographic wills
that are not found in one of the prescribed locations produces a significant
risk of false negative outcomes. 174 Second, the requirement does not
contribute to the efficiency of the will authentication process. Rather than
minimizing litigation regarding the authenticity of holographic wills, the
location requirement breeds litigation by providing an additional issue of
subjective intent that must be decided. 175 As such, North Carolina’s
location requirement for holographic wills is inconsistent with both
generally accepted objectives that policymakers should strive to achieve
when crafting a method of will authentication.
III. LOCATION AND REVOKING HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
Once a will is executed, it can be revoked. 176 Revocation generally is
achieved (1) by the testator executing a subsequent will, 177 (2) by the
testator defacing the will, 178 or (3) by operation of law based upon specific

173. See id.
174. See supra Section II.A.
175. See supra Section II.B.
176. See SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 217.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.1(1) (2017) (“By a subsequent written will or codicil or other
revocatory writing executed in the manner provided herein for the execution of written wills
. . . .”); see also SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 218.
178. N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 31-5.1(2) (2017) (“By being burnt, torn, canceled, obliterated, or
destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking it, by the testator himself or by another
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events that occur between the creation of the will and the testator’s death.179
The consequence of revocation by one of these methods is that a validly
executed will loses its legal effectiveness in whole or in part. 180 As the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has explained, “By revocation is meant
the destruction of the operative force of the will . . . .”181 Thus, a will
obtains operative force only by its compliance with the will execution
statute for either attested or holographic wills, 182 and it loses its operative
force only through one of the methods prescribed by the will revocation
statute.183 Just as North Carolina’s idiosyncratic location requirement for
holographic wills raises policy concerns when examined in the context of
will execution,184 it also produces doctrinal conundrums when considered
in this context of will revocation.
In most jurisdictions, revocation of holographic wills is
straightforward—the testator creates a holographic will at some point
during her life by signing a handwritten testamentary document and then
subsequent acts or events revoke it at a later date. In North Carolina,
however, revocation of holographic wills is not that simple. Indeed,
because the location requirement prevents a signed and handwritten
document from becoming a validly executed holographic will until it is
found at the time of its author’s demise, 185 North Carolina’s holographic
wills statute creates a doctrinal puzzle. If a will cannot be revoked until it is
executed,186 and a holograph cannot be fully executed until the death of the

person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction.”); see also SITKOFF &
DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 217–18.
179. See infra notes 204–13 and accompanying text; see also S ITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra
note 5, at 238–40.
180. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“A will that is revoked is inoperative . . . .”).
181. In re Venable’s Will, 127 N.C. 344, 346, 37 S.E. 465, 465 (1900).
182. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.1 (2017) (“No will is valid unless it complies with the
requirements prescribed therefor by this Article.”).
183. Id. § 31-5.7 (“No will can be revoked in whole or in part by any act of the testator or by
a change in the testator’s circumstances or condition except as provided by G.S. 31-5.1 through
31-5.6 inclusive.”).
184. See supra Part II.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3) (2017); McEwan v. Brown, 176 N.C. 249, 253, 97 S.E.
20, 21 (1918) (“But the finding of a holograph will among the valuable papers of the deceased, or
competent evidence of its deposit in other hands for safe keeping, is as essential a part of the
proof of execution as that the paper writing is in the handwriting of the alleged testator.”); In re
Will of Jenkins, 157 N.C. 429, 435, 72 S.E. 1072, 1074 (1911) (“The provisions of the
[holographic wills] statute are, of course, mandatory and not directory, and therefore there must
be a strict compliance with them before there can be a valid execution and probate of a holograph
script as a will . . . .”).
186. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“From the time of execution, a will is inherently revocable . . . .”).
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testator (i.e., the one who may revoke it), 187 then, in a literal sense, a North
Carolina holographic will cannot be revoked because no one is capable of
doing so. This doctrinal conundrum arises when one examines each of the
three ways in which wills are revoked.
A.

Subsequent Writing

Consider the possibility that a testator attempts to revoke a
holographic will by executing a subsequent attested will. In all jurisdictions
except North Carolina, this scenario would produce little confusion because
the sequence of events typically is clear. The handwritten will is validly
executed when the testator signs it in Year 1, and it is revoked in Year 2,
when the testator executes a valid attested will that expressly revokes all
prior wills. When the testator dies in Year 3, the testator’s estate is
distributed according to the terms of her attested will, as it is undoubtedly
the last will that the testator executed.
In North Carolina, however, the timeline is altered because the
holographic will is not validly executed until it is found in one of the
prescribed locations after the testator’s death. Thus, the testator signs the
handwritten document in Year 1, but it is not a validly executed
holographic will because it has not yet satisfied the location requirement of
the holographic wills statute. The testator then executes her attested will,
which purports to revoke all prior wills, in Year 2. In Year 3, the testator
dies, and her holograph is found in her safe-deposit box. Because the
holograph was not executed until the testator’s death in Year 3, the
execution of the attested will in Year 2 could not revoke it. Therein lies the
conundrum: because an unattested handwritten document is not validly
executed until the testator’s death, it would seem that a testator can never
execute a subsequent will that revokes a holographic will. Moreover,
because the holograph is technically the later-executed of the two wills, it is
the holograph that would prevail to the extent it is inconsistent with the
later-written-but-earlier-executed attested will.
B.

Physical Act

Consider also the possibility that a testator attempts to revoke a
holographic will by destroying it. Under this scenario, the testator signs a
handwritten document in Year 1, burns, tears, or otherwise defaces the
document in Year 2, and then dies in Year 3. In most states, the
consequence of this sequence of events would be easy to assess. The
testator executed a valid holographic will in Year 1, which remained in
effect until the destructive act in Year 2. However, in North Carolina, the
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1625 (2019)

2019]

HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS

1659

same doctrinal conundrum that emerged in the context of revocation by
subsequent writing surfaces in this context of revocation by physical act. If
a handwritten document cannot be a validly executed will until the testator
dies, no North Carolina testator ever has the opportunity to perform a
revocatory act upon a holographic will.
The testator’s apparent inability to revoke a holographic will, either by
the execution of a subsequent will or by a destructive act, does not mean
that the testator cannot prevent her estate from being distributed according
to the terms of a signed and handwritten document. On a basic level, the
location requirement itself provides the testator a mechanism to change her
mind. If an author of an otherwise valid holograph moves it from her safe
(an approved location) to her junk drawer (an unapproved location) and
then dies while it is located there, then the document will not govern the
distribution of her estate because it does not satisfy the location
requirement of the holographic wills statute.188 But while the testator’s act
of moving the handwritten document renders it ineffective, the move does
not “revoke” the document as a will. 189 Rather, it prevents the document
from becoming a validly executed will in the first place.
Additionally, even if a holograph is found in an authorized location
after the testator’s death, it will not necessarily govern the distribution of
the testator’s estate because North Carolina courts seem to have adopted an
approach that sidesteps the doctrinal puzzle posed by the location
requirement. Contrary to both the plain language of the statute and direct
pronouncements by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 190 both of which
clearly state that a holographic will cannot be validly executed until after
the testator’s death, North Carolina courts sometimes refer to a holograph
being executed at the time the testator signs it. 191 Although characterizing
the execution of holographic wills in this way is analytically incorrect, it
does resolve the doctrinal conundrum of the location requirement because
the testator can now either execute a subsequent writing or perform a
destructive act that revokes an “executed” holographic will.

188. Id.
189. Id. § 31-5.7 (identifying the exclusive methods of revocation); see also In re Will of
Zollicoffer, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 303, 305 (1858) (holding that once a will is made, it “could be
revoked only in one of the modes prescribed in the statute”).
190. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether North Carolina courts
intentionally adopted this approach to resolve the doctrinal puzzle or simply stumbled into it
through inattention to the statutory language.
191. See, e.g., Taylor v. Abernethy, 174 N.C. App. 93, 95, 620 S.E.2d 242, 245 (2005)
(explaining that “[o]n 7 October 1997, [the testator] executed a holographic will” and that the
testator “died on 18 January 1998”); Lahrmer v. Norris, 160 N.C. App. 595, 587 S.E.2d 682, 2003
WL 22289953, at *1 (2003) (unpublished table decision) (stating that “[o]n 23 June 2000,
[testator] executed a holographic will” and that the testator “died on 30 July 2000”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1625 (2019)

1660

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

Two cases illustrate how this solution to the puzzle works. The first is
In re Will of Venable,192 which involved a testator who drafted a
holographic will in 1891 and executed an attested will shortly before his
death in 1899. 193 The holographic will contained a provision that expressly
revoked all prior wills and, although the attested will did not contain an
express revocation clause, it did contain provisions that were inconsistent
with provisions contained in the holographic will. 194 After the testator’s
death, the holographic will was found among his valuable papers, 195 and the
court was tasked with deciding whether one or both of these wills should
govern the distribution of the testator’s estate.
If the court were to take the holographic wills statute at face value,
then the court should have found that the holographic will was the
testator’s last and only will. Under this line of reasoning, the holographic
will was not executed until it was found after the testator’s death among his
valuable papers, and therefore it became valid after the testator’s execution
of the attested will. Because the subsequently executed holographic will
expressly revoked all prior wills, literal fidelity to the holographic wills
statute would have resulted in the holographic will being the only
document with legal effect to direct the distribution of the testator’s estate.
The court, however, did not expressly consider this to be a possible
outcome. Instead, the court focused on two other potential outcomes: either
the attested will revoked the holographic will in whole, or it revoked the
holographic will only to the extent that the terms of the two documents
were inconsistent. 196 Both of these possible outcomes flowed from the
court’s characterization of the sequence of events, which it described in this
way: “On August 29, 1891, Haywood Venable executed what purports to
be his holograph[ic] will, found among his valuable papers after his death.
On March 15, 1899, he executed another will a few days before his death
. . . .”197 In this passage, the court described the holographic will as being
“executed” when it was written and signed. 198 By doing so, the court
expressly separated the fact that the holograph was found in an authorized
location from the event of its execution. By focusing on the time at which
the testator authored the holograph rather than when it was found, the court
made way for the conclusion that the testator executed the attested will
subsequent to the execution of the holographic will.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

127 N.C. 344, 37 S.E. 465 (1900).
Id. at 345, 37 S.E. at 465.
Id. at 345–46, 37 S.E. at 465.
Id. at 345, 37 S.E. at 465.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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The second illustrative case is In re Will of Wellborn,199 in which the
court was tasked with determining the effectiveness of a holographic will
that was found in an authorized location but with a tear running through the
testator’s signature. 200 Again, if the court were to take the location
requirement at face value and hold that a holographic will is not validly
executed until it is found after the testator’s death, then the analysis of this
scenario should not focus on revocation because a holographic will can
never be executed at a time when the testator can perform a revocatory act
upon it. Nevertheless, the court focused exclusively on the issue of
revocation when it explained that, if the evidence of the will’s condition
were “accepted by the jury, it would . . . raise a presumption that the tear in
question was done with intent to revoke the will.”201 Although the court did
not expressly describe the holographic will as being executed at the time of
the destructive act, its focus on revocation necessitates such a
characterization because the testator’s destructive act could constitute
revocation only if the document was a validly executed holographic will at
the time that he allegedly tore the signature page.
Through decisions like In re Will of Venable and In re Will of
Wellborn, North Carolina courts have stretched the language of the
holographic wills statute beyond its literal meaning. There is nothing in the
case law to indicate that the North Carolina courts made this decision
consciously. Thus, the result may be the product of inattentive oversight
rather than the product of a reasoned approach to statutory interpretation. In
any event, North Carolina courts need not adopt this approach. Indeed,
North Carolina courts can honor both the language of the statute and the
testator’s intent that a holographic will not be legally effective. As
explained previously, even if a purported holographic will satisfies the
statutory requirements, a court must independently assess whether the
testator intended the document to be her will. 202 Therefore, a purported
holographic will should generally fail if the testator performed one of the
acts that typically revokes a will because such conduct serves as strong
evidence that the testator did not intend the document to be her will. Given
the language of the holographic wills statute, a sounder resolution in a case
like In re Will of Wellborn is simply to find that the purported holographic
will fails for lack of evidence of testamentary intent.
Thus, a holograph found in an authorized location should generally
fail for lack of testamentary intent if it was shown that the author burned,
tore, or in some other way defaced the document. Likewise, if the testator
199.
200.
201.
202.

165 N.C. 636, 81 S.E. 1023 (1914).
Id. at 637–38, 81 S.E. at 1023–24.
Id. at 639, 81 S.E. at 1024.
See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
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executes an attested will after writing and signing a holograph, the
holograph generally should not be effective for the same reason. But again,
the will’s failure in these scenarios would not be a result of “revocation”—
a will cannot be revoked until it is executed, and a North Carolina
holographic will cannot be fully executed during the author’s lifetime. 203
Instead, these acts suggest that the author withdrew her testamentary intent
from the document prior to it becoming a holographic will, even if she
possessed testamentary intent when the document was originally written.
Thus, at the critical moment that the will could be validly executed—the
moment of the author’s death—such a document lacks sufficient indicia of
testamentary intent.
C.

Changed Circumstances

In contrast to revocation by destruction or subsequent writing, both of
which involve an act by the testator that directly relates to the testator’s
will, revocation by operation of law occurs when certain events take place
subsequent to the execution of a will. 204 For example, in North Carolina and
most other domestic jurisdictions, the law revokes any gift to the testator’s
ex-spouse in a will that the testator executed prior to their divorce. 205
Similarly, marriage once revoked a premarital will in some states, 206
including North Carolina until 1967. 207 The modern law, however,
addresses this problem differently, as a subsequent marriage does not
revoke the testator’s will completely. 208 Instead, the testator’s surviving
spouse is given a share of the testator’s estate, 209 which, in essence,
partially revokes other gifts in the will to the extent necessary to fund the
spouse’s gift. Finally, the birth of a child after the execution of a will is
generally treated the same as marriage. 210 The arrival of subsequently born
children does not revoke the testator’s will outright, but such children are
presumptively entitled to a share of the testator’s estate, 211 which again
effectively revokes gifts to other beneficiaries to the extent necessary to
fund the children’s gifts.
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a)(3) (2017).
204. See SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 238–39.
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (2017); see SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 239.
206. See SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 240.
207. In re Will of Mitchell, 285 N.C. 77, 78, 203 S.E.2d 48, 49 (1974) (“Between 9 January
1845 and 1 October 1967 it was the law in North Carolina (with two exceptions not applicable to
this case) that upon the marriage of any person his or her will was revoked.”).
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.3 (2017).
209. Id.; see SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 571.
210. See SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 574–76 (providing the Uniform Probate
Code’s “Omitted Children” section, which allows unintentionally omitted children to receive the
equivalent of their intestate share).
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (2017).
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The rationale of these rules is founded upon the testator’s probable
intent.212 Because most people do not want their ex-spouses to benefit from
their estates and most do want their surviving spouses and children to
benefit, the law presumes that the testator’s failure to update her will after
divorce, marriage, or childbirth was the result of inattentiveness and not a
conscious decision. 213 In these situations, the law views the events that
occur after the execution of a will as providing strong evidence that the will
no longer reflects the testator’s actual intent.
While North Carolina recognizes this policy of adjusting the testator’s
will based upon her probable intent in light of events that occur after a
will’s execution, the state’s location requirement arguably renders
revocation by operation of law inapplicable to holographic wills. Because a
holographic will does not exist until its author is dead, no lifetime events
can occur subsequent to the will’s execution—the testator will never
divorce after the execution of a holographic will nor will other subsequent
events occur that might trigger adjustments to the testator’s will, such as
marriage or birth of a child. As such, it would seem that a North Carolina
holographic will can never be stale because it will always be executed after
the occurrence of all of the testator’s major life events, and consequently it
would seem that revocation by operation of law is irrelevant to North
Carolina holographs.
This conclusion, however, is not sensible. The same policy reasons for
revocation by operation of law exist for holographic wills as for attested
wills. If one testator writes a holographic will and places it in her safedeposit box in Year 1 and leaves it untouched until she dies in Year 30,
there is no reason to believe that the holographic will is any more up-todate than the will of a testator who executes an attested will in Year 1 and
leaves it untouched for the next thirty years. Indeed, just because a North
Carolina holograph becomes fully executed at the time it is found does not
mean that the testator thoroughly considered major life events after drafting
and signing it. Thus, because both attested wills and holographic wills are
susceptible to obsolescence after they are written, revocation by operation

212. See SITKOFF & D UKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 239.
213. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Rodriquez Garcia, 160 P.3d 679, 686 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
(“[R]evocation by divorce statutes rest on the belief that, after a divorce, neither spouse will
usually wish to leave any part of his or her estate to the other . . . .”); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2301 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“This section reflects the view that the intestate share of
the spouse . . . is what the testator would want the spouse to have if he or she had thought about
the relationship of his or her old will to the new situation.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Airbrushed Heirs:
The Problem of Children Omitted from Wills, 50 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 175, 182–83 (2015)
(explaining that the law assumes that testators “would regret not having acted more expeditiously
to modify their estate plans” in reaction to “the subsequent appearance of a child”).
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of law for holographic wills should be measured from the time the will is
written, not from the time the will is found.
Perhaps recognizing that the same policies should apply both to
attested and holographic wills, North Carolina courts again have
(consciously or not) stretched the language of the holographic wills statute
in order reach desired outcomes. Just as they do in the context of
revocation by subsequent writing and physical act, North Carolina courts
refer to holographic wills being executed during the testator’s lifetime
without also considering that the will execution statute makes the discovery
of the will after the testator’s death part of the will execution process. This
reading of the statute allows events, such as divorces, marriages, and births,
to occur after the execution of a holographic will and consequently renders
revocation by operation of law applicable to holographs.
Consider, for example, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McKee.214 In
this case, the testator drafted a holographic will that gave his entire estate to
his wife.215 The couple subsequently had two children, one of whom was
born mere days after the testator drafted the will and one who was born a
few years later.216 After their father’s death, the two children argued that
they should be entitled to a portion of their father’s estate because they
were unintentionally omitted from the will that their father prepared prior
to their births.217 The relevant North Carolina statute provided that “afterborn” children were presumptively entitled to a share of the parent’s
estate,218 and it defined “after-born” as “born . . . subsequent to the
execution of the will.”219
Because the holographic will was not fully executed until it was found
after the testator’s death, it would seem that the children in this case, and
indeed any children omitted from a holographic will, should not be
considered “after-born” as defined by the statute. Nonetheless, the court
used the now-familiar tactic of describing the holographic will as being
executed at the time it was signed rather than when it was discovered after
the testator’s death. 220 By reframing the sequence of events in this way, the
court brought children who are omitted from holographic wills within the
definition of “after-born.”

214. 260 N.C. 416, 132 S.E.2d 762 (1963).
215. Id. at 418, 132 S.E.2d at 764.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 417, 132 S.E.2d at 763.
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5(a) (2017).
219. Id. § 31-5.5(c); see also McKee, 260 N.C. at 418, 132 S.E.2d at 764 (“In simple terms, a
child born after the will is executed takes as in case of intestacy . . . .”).
220. See McKee, 260 N.C. at 418, 132 S.E.2d at 764 (“Ernest Lyndon McKee executed his
will on January 28, 1949. He died on April 9, 1961.”).
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Finally, consider Sawyer’s Legatees v. Sawyer’s Heirs,221 which
analyzed the application of the revocation-upon-marriage statute that was
in effect in North Carolina until the middle of the twentieth century. 222 In
this case, the testator drafted a holographic will the year prior to marrying
his surviving wife. 223 After the testator’s death, the court was faced with the
issue of whether the testator’s subsequent marriage revoked the will. Like
the issue of subsequently born children, the issue of subsequent marriage
seems to be irrelevant to holographic wills under North Carolina law.
Because the location requirement prevents a holographic will from being
fully executed until the testator’s death, the testator’s marriage did not
occur after the execution of his holographic will and consequently the
revocation by operation-of-law statute should be inapplicable.
The court, however, once again characterized the sequence of events
in a way contrary to what the holographic wills statute would seem to
dictate.224 For instance, while advocating for the effectiveness of the
testator’s will, the lawyer for the will’s proponents argued that “the will
had not been revoked” by the testator’s marriage because “although it was
found among the valuable papers, . . . it was [not necessarily] there before
the marriage; ergo, it was not then a will” and therefore “could not then be
revoked.”225 Noticeably, the lawyer did not argue that a holograph is not a
will until it is found. Rather, his argument was that a holograph is not a will
until the testator places it in an authorized location.
The court summarily rejected this argument by again focusing
attention on the moment that the testator signed the holograph. It explained:
The fallacy of the argument is in this: the paper, being found among
his valuable papers, the law makes the inference that it was put there
by the testator, and carries the inference back to the time of its date,
in the absence of any proof to the contrary; [the will is therefore]
presumed to have been executed at the time of its date . . . .226
By presuming the holographic will to be executed at the time the testator
signed it, rather than when it was discovered, the court once again reached
the sensible outcome that the location requirement should not prevent the
application of revocation rules to holographic wills. However, it also once
again ignored the plain language of the holographic wills statute to do so.
Thus, as this case illustrates, not only does North Carolina’s location

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

52 N.C. (7 Jones) 103 (1859).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104.
See id. at 105–08.
Id. at 108.
Id.
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requirement for holographic wills rest upon questionable policy
foundations when considered in the context of will execution,227 but it also
produces complicated doctrinal puzzles that courts must solve through
creative means in order to ensure that will revocation rules apply to
holographic wills.
IV. REFORM AND THE LOCATION OF WILLS
In light of the problems associated with North Carolina’s location
requirement for holographic wills, change is necessary. First, the North
Carolina General Assembly should amend the holographic wills statute so
that the making of a holographic will no longer depends on where it is
found after the testator’s death. Second, North Carolina courts should
consider the location in which a holographic will was stored as evidence of
testamentary intent (or lack thereof). In short, a holographic will’s location
should be downgraded from its current status as a mandatory element to its
rightful status as a relevant consideration.
A.

Abolishing the Location Requirement

Simply put, the location requirement in the North Carolina
holographic wills statute should be repealed. As a will execution formality,
it fails to achieve its intended purposes. 228 The location requirement adds to
neither the accuracy nor the efficiency of the will authentication process. If
anything, it undermines both the accuracy and the efficiency of probate
courts.229 As an additional detriment, it creates unnecessary doctrinal
puzzles in the will revocation process.230 To avoid the absurd result of
irrevocable holographic wills, North Carolina courts have been forced—
intentionally or not—to depart from the actual language of the holographic
wills statute. 231 Removing the location requirement from the holographic
wills statute would solve both problems—it would better accord with the
policy goals underlying will execution formalities and result in a
doctrinally tidy avenue to revoke unwanted holographic wills.
Removing the location requirement would also bring North Carolina
in line with every other jurisdiction in the country that recognizes
holographic wills. Uniformity is important in decedents’ estates, 232 and
227. See supra Part II.
228. See supra Part II.
229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra Part III.
231. See supra Part III.
232. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 5, at 68 (noting the Uniform Law
Commission’s “profound influence on the development of the law of wills, trusts, and estates”);
see also Thomas P. Gallanis, Trusts and Estates: Teaching Uniform Law, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
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perhaps nowhere more so than when it comes to homemade wills. In 1941,
the Tennessee legislature came to the same realization when it abolished
the only other location requirement in a domestic holographic wills
statute.233 In the interim almost eighty years, exactly zero state legislatures
outside of North Carolina have thought it wise to impose a location
requirement on holographic wills. 234 The North Carolina General Assembly
should learn from that collective wisdom and deem the location
requirement of the holographic wills statute a failed experiment.
B.

Considering Location as Evidence of Intent

If the North Carolina General Assembly repeals the location
requirement from the state’s holographic wills statute, the location of a
purported holographic will at the time of the testator’s death should not
become irrelevant to the document’s validity. Rather than being a
mandatory prerequisite for the validity of a holographic will, the
document’s location should be one of the slew of potential considerations
that evince testamentary intent. 235 As explained previously, even if a
document complies with the handwriting and signature requirements for
holographic wills, the probate court must independently assess whether the
testator intended the document to be a valid will. 236 Within this context, a
will’s location may or may not inform the court whether the testator
possessed testamentary intent. 237 Using location as a factor in determining
testamentary intent would be consistent with how courts of other states
view the relevancy of a purported will’s location.

671, 673 (2014) (noting that the Uniform Law Commission is “particularly [active] in the field of
trusts and estates”).
233. See In re Will of Gilkey, 256 N.C. 415, 420, 124 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1962).
234. The few academic commentators who have considered the issue tend to agree. See
Natale, supra note 15, at 200 (“[G]iven the courts’ policy of liberally construing testamentary
intent in holographic wills, the ‘valuable papers or effects’ requirement seems unnecessary and
potentially troublesome.”); Robey-Phillips, supra note 95, at 331 (“[A] valuable-papers
requirement seems misguided.”). But see Williams, supra note 128, at 427 (“As an additional
safeguard, proof should be required either that the will was deposited with a disinterested third
party by the testator, to be produced as his will after his death, or that it was found among the
decedent’s valuable papers, or in some other place indicating its deposit there by him with final
testamentary intent.”).
235. See Natale, supra note 15, at 200 (“In general, if the ‘valuable papers or effects’
requirement were abolished, the place of deposit would still be relevant—rather than being an
essential statutory formality, the place of deposit would constitute circumstantial evidence
bearing on the question of testamentary intent.”).
236. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
237. See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 609, 645–46 (2009) (“From the existing cases we can distill a number of recurring
themes that hold promise as badges of probable intent. [Such badges include whether the will
was] discovered among the testator’s important papers, or among worthless papers.”).
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Although no other state requires that a holographic will be stored in a
particular location, many have a body of case law that illustrates how a
document’s location evidences testamentary intent. The richest case law in
this area tends to come out of Tennessee, which previously had a statute
that, like the current North Carolina statute, required holographic wills to
be kept in certain enumerated locations. 238 Thus, Tennessee courts were
trained to analyze the location of holographic wills as a necessary
component of their validity. In the decades following the statute’s repeal in
1941, however, Tennessee courts tended to expressly use a holographic
document’s location as a non-determinative factor when analyzing whether
the document was made with the necessary testamentary intent. As one
Tennessee appellate court explained:
[T]he present statute dispenses with the requirement that the
propounded instrument must have been found among the valuable
papers of the decedent or lodged in the hands of another for safekeeping; but under the general rules of evidence, the place where the
propounded paper was kept by the writer and found after his death, is
still a circumstance of no little probative value to be considered
along with all of the other facts and circumstances upon the question
of whether he intended it to operate as a will. In short, the effect of
the statutory provision was to reduce the place of deposit from an
essential factor to an evidential circumstance relevant to the animus
testandi.239
Under this approach, storing a holographic document haphazardly
with worthless papers tends to weigh against testamentary intent in
Tennessee.240 However, a holographic will need not be kept with a
decedent’s other testamentary documents, or even along with any valuable
papers at all, as long as there is other sufficient evidence of testamentary
intent.241
Other state courts have also implicitly or expressly employed the
location or manner of a document’s storage as a component of determining
whether a facially ambiguous holograph was written with testamentary
238. See supra note 18.
239. Smith v. Smith, 232 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).
240. Davidson v. Gilreath, 273 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954) (finding that
holographic document found in decedent’s “junk room” was “junk” rather than a document
infused with testamentary intent); see also Smith, 232 S.W.2d at 340, 343–44 (affirming jury’s
finding that holographic document was not a will based in part on the manner in which it was
kept on a pad of paper in a drawer along with unimportant papers rather than in the decedent’s
safe with his valuable papers).
241. See Northcross v. Taylor, 197 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946) (finding that a
holographic document stored in a box by the decedent’s bedside was a valid second codicil to
decedent’s will even though the will and first codicil were stored elsewhere).
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intent. For example, in one Utah case, a holographic document was
discovered that contained a sentence that purported to revoke a prior
attested will, but it also contained other unrelated notes and “a list of
random comments and reminders.”242 Although the language of the
revocatory sentence was clear, the character of the documentary as a whole
was found to be ambiguous regarding the author’s testamentary intent. 243
The decedent had carefully stored the holographic document along with the
allegedly voided prior will in a document holder in a metal box locked
inside a metal cabinet. 244 The trial court found the manner and location in
which the holographic document was stored to be “dispositive” regarding
its nature as a true testamentary document. 245 The appellate court affirmed,
stating that the care with which the holograph was kept was “typical of
someone who is dealing with a document regarded as important; such
lengths are not ordinarily undertaken to preserve a mere list of things to
do.” 246
As this case from Utah suggests, the case law in states other than
North Carolina generally treats a testator’s storage of a purported
holographic will along with other valuable papers as an indication that she
regarded it as important and thus supportive of testamentary intent. 247
Likewise, a testator’s act of lodging a purported holographic will with a
third party for the purpose of safekeeping is typically considered evidence
of testamentary intent. 248 Simply preserving a document at all may
demonstrate some testamentary intent,249 but distributing copies to others
242. Bass v. Englesath (In re Estate of Custick), 842 P.2d 934, 935–36 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
243. Id. at 936.
244. Id. at 935.
245. Id. at 937.
246. Id. at 936 n.3.
247. See also In re Estate of McKean, 48 A.2d 74, 75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946) (finding that a
holographic document was testamentary when, among other things, it was “placed for
safekeeping with the formal will”); Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Morris, 342 S.E.2d 194, 196–97 (W. Va.
1986) (noting that a holographic document was found in the decedent’s bedroom “in the place
where she kept her tax and other important papers” and concluding that “the extrinsic evidence
indicates that the testatrix intended to make a will”).
248. See Monaco v. Peterson (In re Estate of Wolfe), 67 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App.
1968) (noting that the testator, by “sending the letter by registered mail and admonishing [the
recipient] relative to its safekeeping . . . indicated his awareness of the letter’s importance and
character”); see also Scott v. Atkins, 314 S.W.2d 52, 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (entrusting
holographic will to husband for safekeeping deemed reasonable).
249. In one California case, a serviceman wrote a brief holographic will on the fly leaf of a
prayer book while serving overseas in 1944. Smith v. Musser (In re Estate of Stephenson), 45
Cal. Rptr. 121, 122 (Cal Ct. App. 1965). The document requested that, “[i]f necessary,” the
serviceman’s “Good Book and all possessions” be returned to his aunt in California. Id. The
serviceman went on to live until 1961, at which time the prayer book containing the holographic
document was found in a wooden box at the foot of his bed. Id. The trial court found that the
holograph only directed the disposition of the meager possessions that the decedent owned when
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with no instructions regarding the testamentary nature of the document
generally weighs against finding that the author truly regarded the
document as one that disposed of property. 250
Although a will’s location is relevant to the issue of testamentary
intent, it should not be determinative, 251 as a holographic document’s
location is but one of many potential considerations bearing on
testamentary intent. 252 For example, one Texas case featured two purported
wills: an 1895 holograph that was found in the decedent’s trunk with his
valuables and a 1904 holograph that was found in the decedent’s
“residence, in the room where he died, located on a table and under or
among a lot of old letters, circulars, medical journals, and other papers of
no value.”253 In upholding the validity of the 1904 holograph, the court
noted that it “was found in possession of the deceased, it was wholly
written by him, and two disinterested witnesses testified that he told them
that he had willed all of his property to [the beneficiary named in the 1904
holograph].” 254 Thus, the appellate court found that the 1904 holograph
should have been probated as the decedent’s last will despite the fact that it
was stored in a less secure location than the earlier 1895 holograph. 255
The much more recent State v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton)256 case
from Nevada featured similar facts and the same result. The Palm decedent
executed a formal will in 1975 that devised his estate to various relatives
and disinherited his daughter.257 In 1979, the decedent handwrote a codicil
it was written in 1944 and that the remainder of the decedent’s wealth should be distributed
according to the state’s intestacy statute. Id. The appellate court reversed that finding and instead
found that the decedent intended for the entirety of his estate to be distributed to the aunt named
in the holograph; this finding was based in part on the decedent’s “preservation of his holographic
will in his bedroom.” Id. at 123.
250. See In re Will of Dehn, 347 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1973) (finding “[f]rom the
decedent’s actions, correspondence and conversations concerning the six instruments which, after
his death, were found to be floating about Europe and the U.S.A., it is the conclusion of this court
that the decedent did not so intend” any of the documents to be his last will).
251. One scholar has argued that, while a purported holographic will’s location should not be
determinative, it should trigger rebuttable presumptions regarding testamentary intent. See
Robey-Phillips, supra note 95, at 331 (“If the document is discovered among the decedent’s
important papers . . . and meets both the handwriting and signature formalities, a presumption of
validity should arise. However, the presumption should not arise if the document is discovered
simply among the decedent’s everyday belongings, because that would not distinguish a potential
draft from a completed will.”).
252. See, e.g., Brown v. Kelly, 351 P.2d 548, 550 (Mont. 1960) (considering the date and
location of decedent’s handwriting on the back of the alleged holographic will in evaluating
testamentary intent).
253. Ainsworth v. Briggs, 108 S.W. 753, 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
254. Id. at 755.
255. See id. at 756.
256. 272 P.3d 668 (Nev. 2012) (per curiam).
257. Id. at 671.
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on the back of his formal will that left a small portion of his estate to a
friend named Alberta Kelleher. 258 In 1995, following the death of the
decedent’s mother, the decedent wrote Kelleher a holographic letter, in
which he stated that he wanted Kelleher to inherit his entire estate, and that
he did not want any of his relatives to inherit anything. 259 Kelleher
predeceased the decedent by six years.260 Upon the decedent’s death in
2008, a dispute arose regarding whether the decedent’s estate should
escheat to the state based on the disinheritance of all of his relatives in the
1995 letter or whether it should be distributed according to the 1975 formal
will.261
The decedent’s 1975 will was found in his safe-deposit box, and the
1995 letter was found among his miscellaneous papers. 262 The opponents of
the 1995 letter argued that its location demonstrated the decedent’s lack of
intent for the 1995 letter to control the distribution of his estate. 263 The
Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed, finding that “[a]lthough [the
decedent] did not store the 1995 letter in the same manner that he stored the
1975 will, its validity as a holographic will does not depend on him doing
so.” 264 The court found independent indicia of testamentary intent in the
language used in the letter. 265 Ultimately, the court found that the 1995
letter revoked the 1975 formal will and validly disinherited all of the
decedent’s relatives; thus, the decedent’s sizable estate escheated to the
state.266
Should the North Carolina General Assembly abolish the location
requirement from the holographic wills statute, North Carolina courts
would do well to follow the lead of other state courts that consider a
holograph’s place of storage as evidence of testamentary intent. Where a
document is stored undeniably sheds light on how its author regarded it.
Therefore, while a holographic will’s location should not be mandatory to
its validity, neither should it be irrelevant.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 671–72.
260. Id. at 672.
261. Id. at 672–73. Escheat is the process by which a decedent’s property is transferred to the
state in the absence of a will or legal heirs. See John V. Orth, Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?,
13 GREEN BAG 2D 73, 73–74 (2009).
262. Palm, 272 P.3d at 672, 674.
263. Id. at 674.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 680–81.
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CONCLUSION
Requiring holographic wills to be found in certain approved locations
at the time of the testator’s death is unsound policy. It makes the work of
probate courts less efficient and no more accurate. It creates perplexing
conundrums when evaluating whether and how holographic documents
may be revoked. It produces no countervailing benefits to offset these
drawbacks, and there is nothing peculiar about North Carolina testators to
justify the Tar Heel State’s outlier approach to holographic wills.
The North Carolina General Assembly should therefore repeal the
location requirement from the holographic wills statute. A holographic
will’s location should no longer be regarded as a mandatory requirement.
Rather, it should be relegated to the status of just one of the numerous
indicia of testamentary intent. This approach has worked well for numerous
other states. The path is blazed. North Carolina legislators and courts
simply need to pick up the torch and follow the reasoned footsteps on the
trail.

